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Abstract
In this paper we intend to study implications in their most gen-
eral form, generalizing different classes of implications including the
Heyting implication, sub-structural implications and weak strict impli-
cations. Following the topological interpretation of the intuitionistic
logic, we will introduce non-commutative spacetimes to provide a more
dynamic and subjective interpretation of an intuitionistic proposition.
These combinations of space and time are natural sources for well-
behaved implications and we will show that their spatio-temporal im-
plications represent any other reasonable abstract implication. Then
to provide a faithful well-behaved syntax for abstract implications, we
will develop a logical system for the non-commutative spacetimes for
which we will present both topological and Kripke semantics. These
logics unify sub-structural and sub-intuionistic logics by embracing
them as their special fragments.
1 Introduction
I remember that back in 1980, as an undergraduate, I was disap-
pointed in logic, and was thinking of shifting to topology. Then
Van Dalen came along and gave a course at the University of
Amsterdam on sheaves and their relation to logic (the first such
course in Holland), and subsequently organised a stimulating sem-
inar on the subject. A course of lectures on Kripke-Joyal seman-
tics by Michael Fourman formed part of this seminar. I was im-
mediately fascinated by the subject, and still am. [33]
∗Support by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research under grant
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Replacing topology with algebraic geometry and categorical logic with
Brouwer’s liberating revolution, I can hardly imagine a more vivid explana-
tion of Mohammad Ardeshir’s eye-opening influence on my life, both aca-
demic and personal, than what Ieke Moerdijk is drawing in Dirk van Dalen
festschrift. Through Ardehsir’s fascinating explanation of the intutionistic
philosophy and its huge impact on the everyday practice of mathematics, I
found the realm of constructive mathematics and its implications haunting
and hence decided to leave not only my possible future in algebraic geome-
try but the whole discipline of everyday mathematics, altogether. However,
a true revolution knows no border and Brouwer’s was no exception. Start-
ing from the second half of the last century, the anti-realistic interpretation
of mathematics has emerged unexpectedly and as a technical inevitable ne-
cessity in the mainstream mathematics, first in algebraic geometry through
Alexander Grothendieck’s inexhaustible quest for the generalized space and
then in higher geometry, homotopy theory and the so-called homotopical
mathematics. Following this historical thread, my fascination for intuition-
ism and more specifically the intuitionistic implication, is now slowly bringing
me back to algebraic geometry again, where intuitionism might play its most
deserved technical role. In this introduction I intend to explain how such a
seemingly unrelated notion of space can be useful to understand intuitionism
and hence intuitionistic implications. Far better, I will explain how intuition-
ism and geometry, interpreted in its most general sense, are nothing but the
two sides of the same coin.
To establish this connection, we have to first understand the spatial inter-
pretation of the notion of construction. For that purpose, let us start with
the easier notion of constructibility rather than the explicit constructions,
themselves. This means that we are interested in propositions and the prov-
ability relation between them rather than the actual proofs. Let us start with
the creative subject’s mind that may have many possible states. These states
may encode many different data including the knowledge that she possesses
in that mental state. It generally consists of all the constructions to which
she has some reasonable access. For an intuitionist, a proposition is simply
an entity that in every state of the creative subject’s mind, it possesses a
truth value and if the proposition happens to be true at some point, it must
be possible to verify this truth in a finite number of steps. The truth value
checks whether the proposition is derivable from the knowledge in a given
state or not. Interpreting the knowledge as the story that has been told, a
true proposition is exactly what the story can imply. Note that the finite
verifiability condition is different from the decidability of a proposition in a
mental state. For instance, let the knowledge content of a mental state be
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the axioms of Peano arithmetic. Then if something is not derivable from this
theory, there is no a priory way to verify that.
The key point in the connection between intuitionism and topology is the
set of these finitely verifiable propositions. This set has exactly the structure
of the open subsets of a topological space and conversely, for any topological
space, the set of its open subsets can be interpreted as the set of finitely
verifiable propositions in a given theory.1 To explain how to interpret the
set of all finitely verifiable propositions as the open subsets of a topological
space, let us explain the three main structures that this set possess. Let S
be the set of all possible mental states. Then a proposition can be identified
by a subset of S, consisting of all the mental states for which the proposi-
tion holds. First, note that these subsets are ordered by the partial order
A ⊢ B that encodes the situation that the truth of A in any state implies
the truth of B in the same state. The second structure is the finite meets
of the poset, called conjunctions. The reason is that if both A and B are
finitely verifiable propositions, then so is A ∧ B. Because, if A ∧ B holds in
a state, there are finite verifications for both of them and the combination
of these verifications is also finite. Note that the same claim is not necessar-
ily true for infinite conjunctions, because, if the infinite conjunction is true,
we need possibly infinite number of verifications that may exceed any pos-
sible finite memory. The last and the third structure is the arbitrary joins
called disjunctions. For some set I, if Ai is finitely verifiable for any i ∈ I,
then so is
∨
i∈I Ai. Because, if
∨
i∈I Ai holds in a state, then one of them
must hold and since it has a finite verification, the verification also works
for the whole disjunction. Note that the semi-decidability condition and the
existential nature of validity allows arbitrary disjunctions while it prohibits
infinite conjunctions.2 These ingredients are nothing but the conditions on
1Technically, this holds for a pointfree version of topological spaces that are called
locales. However, for the sake of simplicity, in this introduction we limit ourselves only to
topological spaces.
2The reader may argue that using infinite sets and sequences may be somewhat prob-
lematic in the intuitionistic tradition. That is a very reasonable objection but at the same
time it is also worth noting that the real meaning of the set I and the sequence of propo-
sitions {Ai}i∈I is somehow open to meta-mathematical interpretations and therefore they
can be chosen completely constructively. For instance, the set I can be just the set of
natural numbers and the sequence {Ai}i∈I can be a computable sequence of finite sub-
sets. More mathematically, it means that everything in the argument is internalized in an
elementary topos that formalizes what the intuitionist means by a set. For instance, the
effective topos for the Russian school may be a reasonable choice for the universe. Having
all said, the main point here is that while the conjunctions must be finite, the disjunctions
can be arbitrary and this arbitrariness is something up to interpretation.
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a topology of a topological space. Therefore, the set of all finitely verifiable
propositions is actually the set of opens of the space of the mental states.
Therefore, it should not be surprising that intuitionistic propositional logic is
sound and complete with respect to its topological interpretation that reads
a proposition as an open subset of a given topological space; see [32]. In
this sense, intuitionism may be interpreted as the logic of space as opposed
to the classical logic that corresponds to the logic of sets or discrete spaces.
Compare the set of all opens of a space to the opens of a discrete space,
namely the Boolean algebra of all subsets.
Now let us leave the truncated constructibility to address the actual ex-
plicit constructions. In this move, for any state we need a Set-like world
to encode the constructions of the propositions and not just their truth val-
ues. In this setting, the three structures that we have explained transform
to the following higher order notions: First, a poset transforms into a cat-
egory whose objects and morphisms are propositions and the constructions
between them. Secondly, for conjunctions we need the categorical version of
finite meets, i.e., finite limits. And finally, for disjunctions we have to bring
categorical joins, i.e., small colimits. Together with some technical condi-
tions, this new space is nothing but a Grothendieck topos. In this sense,
the generalized notion of space is canonically conceivable from the pure intu-
itionistic conception of a proposition - a truly borderless revolution, indeed!
Moreover, it implies that we should not be surprised that Grothendieck topoi
or their elementary version can serve as the models for intuitionistic set the-
ories or type theories, since the latter is simply the syntactic axiomatization
of the constructions that the former formalizes model-theoretically. Unfor-
tunately, this paper does not have enough space to explain all the details of
this interpretation. However, we strongly encourage the reader to pursue this
logical/philosophical path to geometry and read any geometrical construc-
tion by keeping an eye on the foregoing interpretation. This briefly explained
connection between constructivism and the different incarnations of the no-
tion of space is a very well-established tradition and here we only had time
to see the tip of the iceberg. To see how this connection may lead to some
useful interpretations in topos theory, higher geometry and even computer
science, see [27], [10], [1], [2], [3] and [49].
Now, considering propositions as the open subsets of a (new) space, we are
ready to address the complex, ubiquitous and hard to comprehend notion of
implication. First note that any sophisticated anti-realistic philosophy needs
an act of internalization; the way by which the creative subject internalizes
her own notion of construction to be able to bring them to her consideration
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as the object of the study and not just its instrument. This internalization is
actually what the implication is developed for. It transforms the provability
order between propositions, A ⊢ B, a meta-mathematical property, into the
validity of another proposition, i.e., A→ B. In the case we also care about
the explicit constructions, the implication or in this case the function space,
implements the same idea to transform the set of constructions from A to B
to the constructions of A→ B.
What is an internalizer? For the sake of simplicity, let us limit ourselves
only to the constructibility case. Therefore, we have the provability order
which we intend to internalize. There are many different structures that we
can expect an implication to internalize. For instance, the order is reflexive,
i.e., A ⊢ A for any proposition A and it is transitive, i.e., “A ⊢ B and B ⊢ C
implies A ⊢ C” for any propositions A, B, and C. The internalizations for
these basic properties are ⊢ A→ A and
(A→ B) ∧ (B → C) ⊢ (A→ C),
for any propositions A, B, and C. The order has also all finite conjunctions
meaning that for any two propositions B and C, there exists a proposition
B ∧ C such that for any A we have “A ⊢ B ∧ C iff “A ⊢ B and A ⊢ C””
whose internalization is:
A→ (B ∧ C) = (A→ B) ∧ (A→ C),
and for all finite disjunctions it means the existence of A ∨ B such that for
any C we have “A ∨ B ⊢ C iff “A ⊢ C and B ⊢ C”” whose internalization
is:
(A ∨ B)→ C = (A→ C) ∧ (B → C)
As we can observe by the foregoing instances, there can be many struc-
tures or properties that we may want to internalize and depending on that,
there can be many different possible implications. The usual Heyting im-
plications in posets, exponential objects in categories, the many-valued, the
relevant and the linear implications and the monoidal internal hom structures
in monoidal categories are only some of these many implications. See [31],
[16] and [40]. There are also some non-substructural internalizations. One of
the early examples that also motivated the present work was introduced first
by Visser [50], [51] and re-emerged in a more philosophically motivated form
by Ruitenburg [44] to address the impredicativity problem of the implication.
This implication is morally the Heyting implication without its modus po-
nens rule; see [12], [14], [13], [18]. The emergence of these weak implications
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then set the scene for a plethora of other and sometimes even weaker impli-
cations emerging philosophically [43]; algebraically [39], [19], [5], [6], [7], [8],
[9], [15]; proof theoretically [20], [21], [48], [45]; arithmetically [52], [23], [24]
and via relational semantics [11], [30], almost everywhere in the logical realm.
Apart from the philosophically oriented reasons, the weak implications raise
also some independent mathematical interests. In their propositional form,
they appear in different logical disciplines including provability logic [50] and
preservability logic [52], [23], [24], [30]. In their higher categorical form, they
capture some type constructors called arrows by the functional programming
community. Arrows were first introduced by Hughes [22] to encode some nat-
ural types of function-like entities that are not really functions. For instance,
the type of all partial functions from A to B, for the given types A and B
is such an arrow type. Categorically speaking, they generalize monads, used
elegantly to formalize the computational effects in [34]. For the categorical
formalizations of arrows see [25] and for more information on their role in
programming and type theory see [38] and [29].
Coming back to the spatial interpretation, we are facing a question: If the
notion of space is powerful enough to formalize constructions, why not using
them to also understand implications and exponentials? For this purpose,
we have to bring in another important intuitionistic notion, different from
the usual constructions. This notion is time. Assume that the mental states
encode not only the current knowledge of the mind, but also the relevant
temporal data including the actual moment that the mental state occupies
in the time line. To encode this temporal structure, we add a temporal
modality, ∇, to construct a proposition ∇A from a proposition A, meaning
“A holds at some point in the past”. First note that ∇A is a proposition
itself. Since, if ∇A holds in a mental state, there is some point in the past
in which A holds. But A is a proposition and hence has a finite verification
at that point. Therefore, it is easy to bring that verification to the current
mental state and save it as some temporal information of the past. Secondly,
∇ is clearly monotone and union preserving. The reason for the latter is the
existential nature of ∇. More precisely, if ∇(
∨
i∈I Ai) holds at some state,
then there exists some point in the past in which
∨
i∈I Ai holds. Hence, one
of Ai’s must hold in that point which implies ∇Ai holds at the current state.
The converse is similar and easy. This completes the data we need for the
temporal modality.
Back to the implications, using ∇ as the temporal modality, it is possible
to design an implication that brings the temporal structure to the scene.
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Define the implication by
A→∇ B =
⋃
{C| ∇C ∧ A ⊢ B}.
By this definition and the fact that ∇ preserves all disjunctions, it is not
hard to prove
∇C ∧A ⊢ B iff C ⊢ A→∇ B,
which can be read as a pair of the introduction-elimination rules that de-
fines the implication. These rules state that A →∇ B is a consequence of
C if the fact that C constructed before plus the truth of A at this moment
implies the truth of B. Note that the only role that ∇ plays is delaying
the implication. Philosophically speaking, it is the machinery to ensure a
delay between constructing an implication and using it. For instance, based
on the introduction-elimination rules, we know that ∇(A →∇ B) ∧ A ⊢ B
while there is no reason to have (A→∇ B)∧A ⊢ B. The former means that
A→∇ B holds (constructed) before and hence, at his moment we can argue
that in the presence of A, we can use the implication to show B. While in the
latter case, A →∇ B is just constructed and it can not be applicable at the
moment. Now, identifying the set of propositions by the opens of a topolog-
ical space, we have a mathematical formalization of the foregoing discussion.
It is enough to have a topological space and a monotone and union preserv-
ing map ∇ : O(X)→ O(X) encoding the temporal modality. Calling such a
data a spacetime, we can ensure that all spacetimes have their canonical im-
plications, as defined above. Admittedly, these implications define a special
class of all possible implications. However, we will show that any reasonable
implication is actually representable by these temporal implications. The
advantage of a temporal implication is the full introduction-elimination rules
that it possesses. These rules make a natural machinery for internalization
and leads to a very well-behaved implication as opposed to the arbitrary se-
lection of structures that an implication may randomly internalize. In sum,
our motto is that the study of the notion of time can almost be the study
of the notion of implication. In this paper and in its sequel, we intend to
follow this motto to investigate the general notion of implication via its in-
carnations in the above-mentioned spacetimes. Here, we will focus on the
algebraic side of the story and leave the full general categorical setting and
its categorical spacetimes as the more structured Grothendieck topoi to the
forthcoming work.
The structure of the present paper is as follows. In Section 2, we will
present a rather intense section on preliminaries to make the paper self-
contained and hence accessible for a wider range of audience. In Section
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3 quantales will be presented as the natural generalization of the notion of
space. We will also discuss how to capture a more subjective formalization of
finitely verifiable propositions in which even observing the truth of a propo-
sition changes the mental state. In Section 4, we will define an abstract
implication as an order internalizing operation. Then in Section 5, we will
develop a generalized version of spacetimes via quantales as developed in
Section 3. Section 6 is devoted to the representation theorems to show that
a considerable class of abstract implications are essentially the implications
of the generalized spacetimes. In Section 7, we will continue by developing
a series of sub-structural logics for spacetimes and we will study their topo-
logical semantics. Their Kripke semantics will be introduced in Section 8.
And finally, in Section 9, we will show how to embed the sub-intuitionistic
logics, the logics of weak implications into these more well-behaved logics of
spacetime.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we will review some basic facts and some useful constructions,
including the notions of poset, adjunction, the monoidal posets, quantales
and some completion techniques. These are very well-known facts and con-
structions. However, for the sake of completeness and being accessible to a
wider range of audience, we prefer to briefly explain some necessary parts
here. For more information, see [26], [49] and [17] on locales and completions
and [41] on quantales.
Definition 2.1. By a monoid M = (M,⊗, e), we mean a set M equipped
with a binary multiplication function ⊗ :M×M → M and an element e ∈M
such that the multiplication is associative, i.e., for all m,n, k ∈ M we have
(m⊗ n)⊗ k = m⊗ (n⊗ k) and e is the identity element, i.e., for all m ∈M
we have e ⊗ m = m = m ⊗ e. If M = (M,⊗M , eM) and N = (N,⊗N , eN)
are two monoids, by a homomorphism f : M → N we mean a structure
preserving function f : M → N , i.e., f(eM) = eN and for any m,n ∈ M ,
f(m⊗M n) = f(m)⊗N f(n).
Definition 2.2. By a poset we mean a pair A = (A,≤), where A is a set
and ≤ is a reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive binary relation over A.
By Aop we mean the opposite poset of A, consisting of A with the opposite
order. When there is no risk of confusion, we denote Aop simply by Aop. By
a downset of A, we mean a subset of A that is ≤-downward closed, i.e., a
subset S such that if a ≤ b and b ∈ S, then a ∈ S. By an upset we mean a
≤-upward closed subset, i.e., a subset S such that if a ≤ b and a ∈ S, then
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b ∈ S.
By the join (the meet) of a subset S ⊆ A, we mean the greatest lower bound
(the least upper bound) of S in A, if it exists. We denote it by
∨
S (
∧
S).
If S has at most two elements a, b ∈ A, we use the notation a∨ b for the join
(a∧b for the meet) and we denote the join of the empty set by 0 (the meet of
the empty set by 1). A poset is called join semi-lattice or finitely cocomplete
(meet-semilattice or finitely complete) if the join (meet) of all finite subsets
of A exist. It is called cocomplete (complete) if the join (meet) of all subsets
of A exist. And finally by a map between two posets A = (A,≤A) and
B = (B,≤B), denoted by f : A → B, we simply mean an order preserving
function f : A → B meaning f(a) ≤B f(b) for any a ≤A b. An order-
preserving map is called an embedding if for any a, b ∈ A, the inequality
f(a) ≤B f(b) implies a ≤A b.
Remark 2.3. Note that any cocomplete poset is also complete and vice
verse. It is easy to see that if (A,≤) is cocomplete and S ⊆ A then
∨
{x ∈
A|∀s ∈ S (x ≤ s)} exists and serves as the meet
∧
S. The converse is similar.
Definition 2.4. Let A = (A,≤A) and B = (B,≤B) be two posets and
f : A → B and g : B → A be two maps. The map f is called a left adjoint
for g (or equivalently g is a right adjoint for f), if for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B,
f(a) ≤B b iff a ≤A g(b)
In such situation the pair (f, g) is called an adjunction and it is denoted by
f ⊣ g : B → A or simply f ⊣ g.
Remark 2.5. Note that given f ⊣ g : B → A, we have fg(b) ≤B b, for all
b ∈ B because g(b) ≤B g(b). Similarly, a ≤A gf(a), for all a ∈ A. Moreover,
fgf = f since, for any a, a ≤A gf(a) from which f(a) ≤B fgf(a) and
fg(f(a)) ≤B f(a). Similarly, gfg = g.
Theorem 2.6. (Adjoint Functor Theorem for Posets) Let A = (A,≤A) be a
complete poset and B = (B,≤B) be a poset. Then an order preserving map
f : A → B has a right (left) adjoint iff it preserves all joins (meets).
Proof. See [16].
Definition 2.7. A monoidal poset is a structure A = (A,≤,⊗, e) where
(A,≤) is a poset and (A,⊗, e) is a monoid whose multiplication is compat-
ible with the order, i.e., ⊗ is order-preserving in each of its arguments. A
monoidal poset is called distributive if its poset is a join-semilattice and its
multiplication distributes over all finite joins in each of its arguments.
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Definition 2.8. Let A = (A,≤A,⊗A, eA) and B = (B,≤B,⊗B, eB) be two
monoidal posets. By a lax monoidal map f : A → B we mean an order
preserving function f : A → B such that f(eA) ≥ eB and for any a, b ∈ A
we have f(a ⊗A b) ≥ f(a) ⊗B f(b). A map is called oplax monoidal if it is
order preserving and the last two inequalities are in the reverse order, i.e.,
f(eA) ≤ eB and for any a, b ∈ A we have f(a⊗A b) ≤ f(a)⊗B f(b). A map
is called strict monoidal if it is both lax monoidal and oplax monoidal.
Theorem 2.9. Let A = (A,≤A,⊗A, eA) and B = (B,≤B,⊗B, eB) be two
monoidal posets, f : A → B be an oplax monoidal (lax monoidal) map
and g : B → A be its right (left) adjoint. Then g is lax monoidal (oplax
monoidal).
Proof. We prove the case when f is oplax and f ⊣ g. The other case is
similar. Since f is oplax we have f(eA) ≤B eB from which and by using the
adjunction we have eA ≤A g(eB). For the other condition, note that by the
Remark 2.5, the adjunction implies f(g(a)) ≤B a and f(g(b)) ≤B b. By the
fact that f is oplax, we have
f(g(a)⊗ g(b)) ≤B f(g(a))⊗ f(g(b)) ≤B a⊗ b
and by the adjunction again, we have g(a)⊗g(a) ≤B g(a⊗b), which completes
the proof.
Definition 2.10. A monoidal poset X is called a quantale if its order is
cocomplete and its multiplication distributes over all joins on both sides. A
quantale is a locale if its monoidal structure is the meet structure of the
poset. In other words, a locale is a cocomplete poset whose meet distributes
over all of its joins.
Remark 2.11. Note that quantales are also complete. This provides the
enough structure to interpret conjunctions in a quantale, as we will see later.
Here are some prototypical examples of locales and quantales that we will
need in the future.
Example 2.12. Let S = (S,≤) be a cocomplete poset and define X as the
set of all join preserving functions f : S → S with the pointwise order ≤X .
Then X = (X,≤X , ◦, id) is a quantale where ◦ is the usual composition and
id : S → S is the identity map.
Example 2.13. LetX be a set andR be a set of binary relations overX that
includes the equality and is closed under composition and arbitrary union.
Then X = (R,⊆, ◦,=) is a quantale where ◦ is the relation composition.
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Example 2.14. Let X be a topological space. Then X = (O(X),⊆,∩, X)
is a locale where O(X) is the set of all open subsets of X .
Example 2.15. Let M = (M,⊗, e) be a monoid. Consider I(M) as the
set of all left ideals of M, i.e., the subsets of M closed under arbitrary left
multiplication. Then (I(M),⊆, ·,M) is a quantale where
I · J = {ij|i ∈ I, j ∈ J}
The reason is that the union of any set of ideals is an ideal again and the
multiplication clearly distributes over the union.
Note that if X is a quantale, then for any fixed a ∈ X, the functions
la, ra : X→ X mapping x into a⊗x and x⊗a, respectively, preserve all joins
and since the poset is cocomplete, by the adjoint functor theorem, Theorem
2.6, they both have right adjoints. Because of some technical reasons, we
are only interested in la. Therefore, it will be useful to have a name and a
notation for la’s right adjoint. We denote it by a ⇒ (−) and we call the
binary operator⇒, the canonical implication of the qunatale X. Spelling out
the adjunction conditions, it means that for any a, b, c ∈ X, we have a⊗b ≤ c
iff b ≤ a⇒ c. Note that if X is a locale, its canonical implication is just the
usual Heyting implication of X.
Definition 2.16. Let X,Y be two quantales. Then by a lax/oplax/strict
geometric morphism f : X → Y, we mean a lax/oplax/strict monoidal join
preserving map f : X→ Y.
Example 2.17. Let X and Y be two topological spaces, O(X) and O(Y )
be the poset of all open subsets of X and Y , respectively and f : X → Y
be a continuous function. Then f−1 : O(Y ) → O(X) is a strict geometric
morphism.
It is worth mentioning that over locales, any join preserving map f :
X→ X is an oplax geometric morphism because f is order preserving which
implies f(a ∧ b) ≤ f(a) ∧ f(b).
Example 2.18. Let X and Y be two sets and f : X → Y be a function.
Then f induces a lax geometric morphism f ∗ : P (Y × Y ) → P (X × X)
by f ∗(R) = f−1(R). It is clearly union preserving. Moreover, for any two
relations R, S ⊆ Y × Y , we have f−1(R) ◦ f−1(S) ⊆ f−1(R ◦ S), because,
if (x, y) ∈ f−1(R) ◦ f−1(S) then there is z ∈ X such that (x, z) ∈ f−1(S)
and (z, y) ∈ f−1(R). Therefore, (f(x), f(z)) ∈ S and (f(z), f(y)) ∈ R which
implies (f(x), f(y)) ∈ R ◦ S from which (x, y) ∈ f−1(R ◦ S).
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The function f also induces an oplax geometric morphism. Define f∗ : P (X×
X) → P (Y × Y ) by f∗(R) = f [R] as the image of R. This is also union
preserving. Moreover, we have f(R ◦ S) ⊆ f(R) ◦ f(S), because, if (x, y) ∈
f(R◦S) then there is x′, y′, z′ ∈ X such that x = f(x′), y = f(y′), (x′, z′) ∈ S
and (z′, y′) ∈ R. Therefore, (f(x′), f(z′)) ∈ f∗(S) and (f(z′), f(y′)) ∈ f∗(R).
Hence, (x, y) = (f(x′), f(y′)) ∈ f∗(S) ◦ f∗(R).
Example 2.19. Let M = (M,⊗M , eM) and N = (N,⊗N , eN) be two
monoids and f :M→N be a homomorphism. Then f induces a lax geomet-
ric morphism f ∗ : I(N )→ I(M) by f ∗(I) = f−1(I). It is clearly union pre-
serving. Moreover, we have f ∗(I)f ∗(J) ⊆ f ∗(IJ) because if x ∈ f ∗(I)f ∗(J)
then there are y ∈ f ∗(I) and z ∈ f ∗(J) such that x = yz. Since f is a
homomorphism we have f(x) = f(y)f(z) ∈ IJ . Therefore, x ∈ f ∗(IJ).
The homomorphism f also induces an oplax geometric morphism defined
by f∗ : I(M) → I(N ) by f∗(I) = Mf [I], where f [I] is the image of I and
Mf [I] is the generated left ideal of the image of I. This map clearly preserves
union. Moreover, f∗(IJ) ⊆ f∗(I)f∗(J), because if x ∈ f∗(IJ), then there are
m ∈M , i ∈ I and j ∈ J such that x = mf(ij). Since f is a homomorphism
we have x = mf(i)f(j) = (mf(i))f(j) ∈ f∗(I)f∗(J).
In the rest of this section, we will recall some of the main completion tech-
niques for the monoidal posets. We will address the details of constructions
as we need them later in some other constructions of the paper.
Theorem 2.20. (Downset and Ideal Completions) Let A = (A,≤,⊗, e) be
a monoidal poset. Then there exists a quantale D(A), called the downset
completion of A and a strict monoidal embedding i : A → D(A). If A
has all finite joins and distributive, then there exists another quantale I(A),
called the ideal completion of A and a finite join-preserving strict monoidal
embedding i : A → I(A). If A has all finite meets, then in both cases i
preserves all finite meets.
Proof. First let us explain the downset completion that works for monoidal
posets that do not necessarily have the join structure. Later we will also
address the joins and the distributive case. Define X = D(A) as the set of
all downsets of A with the inclusion as its order. Since downsets are closed
under arbitrary union and intersection, they are the joins and the meets of
the poset, respectively. Define the map i : A→ X by i(a) = {x ∈ A|x ≤ a}
and the monoidal structure of X by eX = i(e) and
I ⊗X J = {x ∈ A| ∃i ∈ I∃j ∈ J (x ≤ i⊗ j)},
for any downsets I and J . Note that I ⊗X J is also a downset. Moreover, it
is not hard to prove that this multiplication is associative with the identity
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element eX and it distributes over all unions. Therefore, (X,⊗X, eX) is actu-
ally a quantale. Moreover, i is a strict monoidal map because by definition,
eX = i(e) and
i(a)⊗X i(b) = {x ∈ A|∃i ≤ a∃j ∈ b (x ≤ i⊗ j)} = {x ∈ A|x ≤ a⊗ b}.
Finally, note that i is clearly an embedding, because,
i(a) ⊆ i(b) iff {x ∈ A|x ≤ a} ⊆ {x ∈ A|x ≤ b} iff a ≤ b,
and if A has all finite meets, i preserves them because, i(1) = {x ∈ A|x ≤
1} = A and
x ∈ i(a) ∩ i(b) iff (x ∈ a and x ∈ b) iff x ≤ a ∧ b iff x ∈ i(a ∧ b),
which implies i(a) ∩ i(b) = i(a ∧ b).
Now, let us move to the distributive case, where A = (A,≤,⊗, e) has all
finite joins. Then the foregoing function i does not necessarily preserve the
join structure of A. To handle this issue, we have to change X a little bit:
Define Y = I(A) as the poset of all ideals of A, i.e., all downsets I ⊆ A such
that 0 ∈ I and a ∨ b ∈ I, for any a, b ∈ I. We want to show that Y with the
join
∨
i∈N
Ii = {x ∈ A|∃x1, . . . xn ∈
⋃
i∈N
Ii (x ≤
n∨
j=1
xj)}
and the same monoidal structure as of X’s is a quantale and the previous
function i is again an embedding that also preserves all finite joins. First,
it is not hard to prove that
∨
maps ideals to ideals and is actually the
join of the family {Ii}i∈N in the inclusion order over ideals. Secondly, note
that the original i : A → X actually lands into the set of ideals Y, because,
{x ∈ A|x ≤ a} is closed under all finite joins. Note also that i preserves all
finite joins because,
i(a) ∨ i(b) = {x ∈ A|∃i ≤ a∃j ≤ b (x ≤ i ∨ j)} = {x ∈ A|x ≤ a ∨ b}.
Since the intersection of ideals is also an ideal, the meet structure for ideals
is also the intersection. Hence, the same argument for meet preservation by
i works here, as well. Thirdly, note that the defined ⊗ on X maps ideal to
ideals, meaning that if I and J are ideals then so is I ⊗ J . To prove this
claim, first note that 0 ⊗ 0 ≤ 0 ⊗ e = 0 from which 0 ⊗ 0 = 0 and hence
0 ∈ I ⊗ J . Secondly, assume that x, y ∈ I ⊗ J . We want to show that
x ∨ y ∈ I ⊗ J . By definition, there exist i, i′ ∈ I and j, j′ ∈ J such that
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x ≤ i⊗ j and y ≤ i′⊗ j′. By monotonicity of ⊗ we have x ≤ (i∨ i′)⊗ (j ∨ j′)
and y ≤ (i∨i′)⊗(j∨j′) and hence x∨y ≤ [(i∨i′)⊗(j∨j′)]. Since both I and
J are closed under finite joins, i∨i′ ∈ I and j∨j′ ∈ J and hence, x∨y ∈ I⊗J .
Finally, we show that the multiplication distributes over joins, i.e.,
∨
n∈N
(In ⊗ J) = (
∨
n∈N
In)⊗ J and I ⊗ (
∨
n∈N
Jn) =
∨
n∈N
(I ⊗ Jn).
We will prove the left equality. The right one is similar. There are two
directions to prove.
∨
n∈N(In⊗ J) ⊆ (
∨
n∈N In)⊗ J is clear by monotonicity.
For the other direction, assume x ∈ (
∨
n∈N In)⊗J . By definition, there exist
y ∈
∨
n∈N In and j ∈ J such that x ≤ y ⊗ j. Again by definition, there exist
i1, i2, . . . , ik ∈
⋃
n∈N In such that y ≤ i1 ∨ . . .∨ ik. By distributivity, we have
x ≤ (i1 ⊗ j) ∨ (i2 ⊗ j) ∨ . . . ∨ (ik ⊗ j).
But since each ir is in at least one Imr , we have
ir ⊗ j ∈ (Imr ⊗ J) ⊆
∨
n∈N
(In ⊗ J).
Since
∨
n∈N (In⊗J) is closed under finite joins, we have x ∈
∨
n∈N(In⊗J).
Remark 2.21. Note that in the both downset and ideal completions, if the
monoidal structure of A is just the meet structure, i.e., ⊗ = ∧ and e = 1,
then ⊗X is the intersection because
I ⊗X J = {x ∈ A| ∃i ∈ I∃j ∈ J (x ≤ i ∧ j)} = I ∩ J,
which is the meet of X and also eX is i(1) which is the top element 1X =
i(1) = A.
Theorem 2.22. (Lifting Monoidal Maps) Let A = (A,≤A,⊗A, eA) and B =
(B,≤B,⊗B, eB) be two monoidal posets and f : A → B be a lax (oplax)
monoidal map. Then there exists a lax (oplax) geometric map f! : D(A) →
D(B) such that f!iA = iBf , where iA and iB are the canonical embeddings of
the downset completions of A and B, respectively. Moreover, if both A and
B have all finite joins and are distributive, and if f : A → B is finite join
preserving, then the same holds for some map f! : I(A)→ I(B).
Proof. First let us prove the downset case. We will address the ideal case
later. Define
f!(I) = {x ∈ A| ∃i ∈ I (x ≤B f(i))}.
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This set is clearly a downset, hence f! is well-defined. Moreover, note that
f!(iA(a)) = {x ∈ A| ∃i ≤A a (x ≤B f(i))} = {x ∈ A|(x ≤B f(a))} = iB(f(a)).
The map f! obviously preserves all unions. We have to prove that if f is lax
(oplax), then so is f!. Assume f is lax monoidal. The other case is similar.
We have to prove that iB(eB) ⊆ f!(iA(eA)) and f!(I)⊗ f!(J) ⊆ f!(I ⊗ J), for
any downsets I and J of A. For the first, assume x ∈ iB(eB), then x ≤B
eB ≤B f(eA). Hence, x ∈ f!(iA(eA)). For the second, if x ∈ f!(I) ⊗ f!(J),
then there are y ∈ f!(I) and z ∈ f!(J) such that x ≤ y ⊗ z. Since y ∈ f!(I)
and z ∈ f!(J) there are i ∈ I and j ∈ J such that y ≤ f(i) and z ≤ f(j).
Hence, x ≤ f(i)⊗ f(j) ≤ f(i⊗ j), which implies x ∈ f!(I ⊗ J).
For the ideal completion case, we define the same f!. However, we have to
check whether it is ideal and join preserving. It is an ideal because, 0 ≤ f(0)
and since 0 ∈ I we have 0 ∈ f!(I). Moreover, if x, y ∈ f!(I) then there
are i, j ∈ I such that x ≤ f(i) and y ≤ f(j). Since f is monotone, we
have x ∨ y ≤ f(i ∨ j). Since I is an ideal we have i ∨ j ∈ I and hence
x ∨ y ∈ f!(I). Furthermore, we have to check that f! is join preserving. For
that matter, we have to show f!(
∨
n∈N In) =
∨
n∈N f!(In). From right to left
is easy by monotonicity of f!. For the left to right, assume x ∈ f!(
∨
n∈N In).
Hence, there are i1, . . . , ik ∈
⋃
n∈N In such that x ≤ f(i1 ∨ . . . ∨ ik). Since
f is join preserving we have x ≤ f(i1) ∨ . . . ∨ f(ik) which implies that x ∈∨
n∈N f!(In).
Upset and Filter Completions. Using two ideal completions in an
appropriate way leads to a very useful construction that we call the upset
construction. The details follow. Let A = (A,≤,⊗, e) be a monoidal poset
and denote the downset qunatale of A by D(A) and the opposite of A,
the same structure with the reverse order, by Aop. Then by the downset
completion for Aop, there exists a strict monoidal embedding i : Aop →
D(Aop) or equivalently i : A → D(Aop)op. It is useful to observe that D(Aop)
is nothing but the poset of all upsets of A with the multiplication:
P ⊗Q = {x ∈ A|∃y ∈ P∃z ∈ Q (x ≥ y ⊗ z)}.
Denote this poset by U(A). Now we use the same operation again to embed
D(Aop)op into D(D(Aop)op). Combining these two embeddings, we reach a
strict monoidal embedding of A into D(D(Aop)op) which we call the upset
completion of A. Spelling out the construction of the upset completion, the
set consists of all the upsets of the upsets of A with the inclusion as its order
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and the following multiplication for any upsets of upsets X and Y :
X ⊗ Y = {P ∈ U(A)|∃Q ∈ X∃R ∈ Y (P ⊇ Q⊗ R)}.
Moreover, the embedding is simply expressible by i(a) = {P ∈ U(A)|a ∈ P}.
In the case that the monoidal poset is a meet semi-latticeA = (A,≤,∧, 1),
there is another construction that is called the canonical construction C(A)
and an embedding i : A → C(A) that respects all finite meets. A non-empty
upset of A is called a filter if it is closed under all finite meets. Denote the
class of all filters of A by F (A) and then define C(A) as the poset of all upsets
of filters and use the same i as defined before. The embedding i : A → C(A)
preserves all finite meets. First note that all filters include 1, thus
i(1) = {P ∈ F (A)|1 ∈ P} = F (A).
Secondly, note that the filters are closed under meets. Hence,
i(a∧b) = {P ∈ F (A)|a∧b ∈ P} = {P ∈ F (A)|a ∈ P and b ∈ P} = i(a)∩i(b).
In case A has all finite joins and it is distributive, it is also possible to
change the canonical construction so that i also preserves the finite joins. The
construction is as follows: A filter is called prime if it is proper and for any
a, b ∈ A, the assumption a∨ b ∈ P implies either a ∈ P or b ∈ P . Denote the
set of all prime filters by P (A). If we change C(A) to the poset of all upsets of
P (A) with the same i, then i preserves both finite joins and finite meets. The
reasoning for the meet is the same as before. For the joins, since prime filters
are proper, we have 0 /∈ P , which implies i(0) = {P ∈ P (A)|0 ∈ P} = ∅ and
i(a∨b) = {P ∈ P (A)|a∨b ∈ P} = {P ∈ P (A)|a ∈ P or b ∈ P} = i(a)∪ i(b).
3 Intuitionism via Quantales
In the Introduction, we have seen that any finitely verifiable proposition can
be interpreted as an open subset of a topological space. In this interpreta-
tion, the corresponding open subset captures the set of all the mental states
in which the proposition actually holds. More operationally, a finitely verifi-
able proposition A is just an observation that reads a mental state and finds
the truth value of A in that state, in the same way that a physical quantity
like the speed or the temperature can be seen as an observation that reads a
physical state to find the value of the quantity.
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Reading propositions as observations suggests that we silently believe in
some sort of an independent objective mind. Let us assume that the creative
subject observes her mental state to check the validity of a proposition. It
seems that this introspection only observes a mental state and extracts some
needed information from it but it does not affect the mental state at all. The
situation is similar to the classical assumption that the physical observations
do not affect the physical phenomenon that they are observing. It measures
a quantity ideally without distorting the picture or interfering with any other
observation. This may be the case when we interpret the knowledge content
of a mental state as a set of propositions and the validity of a proposition
as its provability. Then it is just a real factual situation and it is not im-
portant what, when and in what order we are observing the validity of the
propositions. However, it is totally possible to imagine a more subjective,
more dynamic and more interactive formalization of knowledge. One possi-
ble scenario to show how natural such a situation could be is the following:
Interpret the knowledge content of a mental state as a set of propositions as
before but change the validity from provability to immediate provability. It
means that a valid proposition is either in the set or provable in one step via
some given proving methods from the set. Observing a proposition in this
scenario clearly affects the mental state. If a proposition holds in a mental
state, it is provable in at most one step. Then since the creative subject
thinks about the proposition and finds out the proof, it is totally reasonable
to assume that she then modifies her knowledge to add this new proposition
to the set she had before. The observation process is also interactive. In
each step, there could be many one-step provable propositions and hence it
could be important to choose which way she wants to proceed. This choice
may change her path forever. It is also non-commutative because A may be
immediately provable and its presence makes B also immediately provable
while the proposition B is not immediately provable without using A. Hence,
proving A after B may not be even possible.
This is only one possible scenario. Now let us find a more formal way to
express not only this scenario but its essential dynamic, interactive and non-
commutative nature. We will begin by a toy example to be prepared to find
the algebraic abstract formalization later. Let S be the set of all the mental
states and identify a proposition not by a subset of S but by a binary relation
A ⊆ S × S that includes (s, t) if the proposition A holds in the state s, its
truth is verifiable in a finite number of steps and this verification changes the
mental state s to t. Using this example, we can also identify the previous
static interpretation of knowledge as the non-state-changing relations, i.e.,
the relations like A with the property that if (s, t) ∈ A then s = t. These
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A’s are simply identifiable by the subset {s ∈ S|(s, s) ∈ A} of the mental
states where they are valid. This is simply our previous proposition-as-subset
formalization.
To formalize the calculus of this new interpretation of finitely verifiable
propositions, we try to provide an algebraic axiomatization reflecting the
main intuitive properties of this toy example. Here again we have three
main structures. The first obvious structure is the order between the propo-
sitions encoding how a proposition implies another one. This order in our
toy example is the inclusion order between the binary relations. Secondly,
propositions has a natural notion of composition. Philosophically speaking,
for any two propositions A and B, we can imagine A⊗B as the composition
of observations, first applying B and then A. A⊗B changes the state s to t
if B holds in s and maps s to some state r where A holds. This r then must
be mapped to t by A. In our toy example composition is simply the composi-
tion of relations. Note that this composition is clearly associative and has an
identity element. The identity element is simply the do-nothing observation.
In our toy example it is the equality relation over S. Moreover, note that
in the static interpretation of propositions when A and B are encoded by
subsets {s ∈ S|(s, s) ∈ A} and {s ∈ S|(s, s) ∈ B}, their composition A⊗ B
will be {s ∈ S|(s, s) ∈ A} ∩ {s ∈ S|(s, s) ∈ B} which is nothing but the
intersection. This shows how this dynamic approach really generalizes the
static topological interpretation of the Introduction.
Finally, let us address the finiteness condition. Note that the poset of
propositions is cocomplete as we explained in the Introduction, simply be-
cause for any set I, if all Ai’s are all finitely verifiable, then their disjunction∨
i∈I Ai is also finitely verifiable. The main point is that for verifying a dis-
junction it is enough to verify one of them. How does a disjunction act on the
states? It just combines the actions of all Ai’s, since observing the validity
of
∨
i∈I Ai is just observing one of Ai’s and hence it changes a states s to
one of the states that one of Ai’s may dictate. The disjunction in our toy
example is just the union of relations. Moreover, note that the composition
distributes over all joins because doing the observation B after “at least one
of Ai’s” is nothing different than doing one of “Ai’s before B”. The same
also goes for the other argument of the multiplication. Therefore, to make
a calculus for finitely verifiable propositions in its dynamic interactive sense,
we need a cocomplete monoidal poset whose multiplication distributes over
all joins on both sides. This is nothing but a quantale. Note that if we
collapse the monoidal structure to the meet structure as in the non-state-
changing-observation interpretation dictates, then the quantale turns into a
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locale, the point-free version of a topological space. Interpreting locales as
the calculus of non-state-changing observations were developed by Abramsky
in [1] and [2] and Vickers in [49]. This generalization to quantales has its
roots even in [35] where quantales first appeared to provide an algebraic for-
malization for non-commutative C∗-algebras. However, in its explicit form,
the state-changing interpretation is developed in [3] and has been important
in the connection between the quantales and their categorical monoidal ver-
sions on the one hand and the formalization of processes and observations in
computer science and quantum physics on the other.
4 Abstract Implications
Philosophically speaking, an implication is a conditional proposition inter-
nalizing the provability order of the poset of all propositions. Traditionally,
the internalization has been implemented via Heyting implications or in a
more general setting of monoidal posets via residuations for right and left
multiplications. We argue that this tradition is far more restricting than
what a basic internalization task demands. As we have seen already in Intro-
duction, internalizations can take place in many different levels to internalize
many different structures. For instance, if we have a meet-semilatice, the im-
plication may internalize the basic structures of reflexivity and transitivity
via the axioms a→ a = 1 and
(a→ b) ∧ (b→ c) ≤ (a→ c),
or it can go one step further to also internalize the finite meet structure via
a→ (b ∧ c) = (a→ b) ∧ (a→ c),
or in the case that the meet-semilatice has all finite joins, the join structure
via
(a ∨ b)→ c = (a→ c) ∧ (b→ c).
We propose that the minimum reasonable conditions for any internalization
is the inernalization of reflexivity of the order and its transitivity. However,
it does not need to be over meet-semilattices. We can use a more general
setting where we only have a monoidal poset:
Definition 4.1. LetA = (A,≤,⊗, e) be a monoidal poset. By an implication
→: Aop × A → A, we mean any order preserving map with the following
properties:
(i) e ≤ a→ a,
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(ii) (a→ b)⊗ (b→ c) ≤ (a→ c),
The structure A = (A,≤,⊗, e,→) is called a strong algebra if → is an
implication. And if A = (A,≤A,⊗A, eA,→A) and B = (B,≤B,⊗B, eB,→B)
are two strong algebras, by a strong algebra morphism we mean a strict
monoidal map f : A → B that also preserves →, i.e., f((−) →A (−)) =
f(−)→B f(−).
Remark 4.2. Based on the order preservability of the implications in their
second arguments, it is possible to strengthen the axiom (i) by the following
more general axiom: (i′): If a ≤ b then e ≤ a→ b.
Remark 4.3. Different versions of strong algebras are defined in the liter-
ature under many different names. Usually, the definitions use lattices and
the meet structure as the monoidal structure, i.e., ⊗ = ∧ and e = 1. They
also start with relatively more internalization axioms, including the internal-
ization of finite meets and finite joins, as mentioned above. These algebras
are the natural algebraic models for sub-intuitionistic logics. See for instance
[39], [19], [15], [5], [6], [7] and [8] for the algebraic notions and [12], [13], [9]
and [39] for their role in sub-intuitionistic logics.
Example 4.4. By a left residuated algebra we mean a monoidal poset A =
(A,≤,⊗, e) with a binary operation⇒ such that x⊗y ≤ z is equivalent to y ≤
x ⇒ z, for all x, y, z ∈ A. More specifically, a finitely complete and finitely
cocomplete left residuated algebra with the meet structure as its monoidal
structure is called a Heyting algebra. Spelling out, a Heyting algebra is a
finitely complete and finitely cocomplete poset H = (H,≤,∧,∨, 1, 0) with a
binary operation ⇒ such that x ∧ y ≤ z is equivalent to y ≤ x ⇒ z, for all
x, y, z ∈ H . It is clear that⇒ in any left residuated algebra is an implication.
Note that if X is a quantale, then (X,⇒X) is a left residuated algebra where
⇒X is the canonical implication of X. Therefore, ⇒X is also an implication.
Constructing New Implications from the Old
There are some simple methods to make new implications from the old. Two
of these methods play an important role in our future investigations. Here
we will explain them. See also [15].
The First Method. For the first method, let A = (A,≤,⊗, e,→) be a
strong algebra and F : A → A be a monotone function (not necessarily
lax or oplax). Then A = (A,≤,⊗, e,→F ) where a →F b = F (a) → F (b)
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is a strong algebra. The reason is that F (a) ≤ F (a) and since → is an
implication, we have e ≤ F (a)→ F (a). The other axiom is trivial, because
(F (a)→ F (b))⊗ (F (b)→ F (c)) ≤ (F (a)→ F (c))
The Second Method. Let A = (A,≤,⊗, e,→) be a strong algebra and
let G : A → A be a lax monoidal map. Then the structure A = (A,≤
,⊗, e,→G) where a →G b = G(a → b) is also a strong algebra. The reason
is the following. Since → is an implication, then e ≤ a → a. Since G is
monotone G(e) ≤ G(a→ a). Since G is lax we have e ≤ G(e) which implies
e ≤ G(a→ a). For the second axiom, since G is lax and→ is an implication,
we have
G(a→ b)⊗G(b→ c) ≤ G((a→ b)⊗ (b→ c)) ≤ G(a→ c)
Later in Section 6, we will prove some representation theorems to show that
any implication is essentially the result of applying these two methods on the
canonical implication of a quantale.
Example 4.5. Let H = (H,≤,∧,∨, 1, 0,⇒) be a Heyting algebra. Then
for some a ∈ H , consider Ca : H → H as the constant function with the
value a i.e., Ca(x) = a; Ma : H → H as Ma(x) = a ∧ x and Ja : H → H
as Ja(x) = a ∨ x. Then since Ca is meet-preserving and Ma and Ja are
monotone, all the following operations are implications: [x →Ca y = a],
[x→Ma y = (x ∧ a⇒ y ∧ a)] and [x→Ja y = (x ∨ a⇒ y ∨ a)].
Example 4.6. Let X be a topological space, f : X → X be a continuous
function and O(X) be the locale of all open subsets of X . Since f−1 :
O(X)→ O(X) preserves all unions, by the adjoint functor theorem, Theorem
2.6, it has a right adjoint. Call it g : O(X) → O(X). Since g is a right
adjoint, it preserves all meets. Therefore, it is lax monoidal. Therefore, the
operation U → V = g(U ⇒ V ), where ⇒ is the Heyting implication on
O(X) is an implication by the second construction.
Definition 4.7. Let A = (A,≤,⊗, e,→) be a strong algebra. It internalizes
its monoidal structure if for all a, b, c ∈ A:
a→ b ≤ c⊗ a→ c⊗ b
A is called closed if it has the left residuation, i.e., the operation⇒ such that
a⊗ b ≤ c iff b ≤ a⇒ c, for any a, b, c ∈ A. A strong algebra internalizes the
closed monoidal structure if it is closed, it internalizes the monoidal structure
and for all a, b, c ∈ A:
a⊗ b→ c ≤ b→ (a⇒ b)
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Remark 4.8. For strong algebras for which the monoidal structure is the
meet structure, internalizing the monoidal structure simply means a→ (b ∧
c) = (a → b) ∧ (a → c), for all a, b, c ∈ A. First note that we always have
a→ (b∧ c) ≤ (a→ b)∧ (a→ c) because, → is order preserving in its second
argument. Now, assume that A internalizes its monoidal structure, then we
have
(a→ b) ≤ (a ∧ a→ a ∧ b) and (a→ c) ≤ (b ∧ a→ b ∧ c)
implying
(a→ b) ∧ (a→ c) ≤ (a ∧ a→ a ∧ b) ∧ (b ∧ a→ b ∧ c) ≤ (a→ b ∧ c)
Therefore, (a→ b) ∧ (a→ c) ≤ a→ (b ∧ c) and hence
a→ (b ∧ c) = (a→ b) ∧ (a→ c)
Conversely, since c ∧ a ≤ c we have c ∧ a → c = 1. Moreover, c ∧ a ≤ a
implies (a→ b) ≤ (c ∧ a)→ b. Hence,
(a→ b) ≤ [(c ∧ a)→ c] ∧ [(c ∧ a)→ b] = (c ∧ a→ c ∧ b)
Example 4.9. LetX be a set and f : X → X be a function. Consider P (X),
the poset of all subsets of X and F : P (X)→ P (X) defined by F (A) = f [A],
where f [A] is the image of A. Since F is monotone, A→ B = F (A)⇒ F (B)
is an implication, where ⇒ is the usual Boolean implication on P (X). In
a special case, if we choose X and f such that f is surjective and for some
subsets of X such as A,B we have f [A ∩ B] 6= f [A] ∩ f [B], then →F does
not internalize the monoidal structure (the meet) because,
[1→F (A ∩ B)] = [F (1)⇒ F (A ∩B)] = F (A ∩ B)
[(1→F A)∩(1→F B)] = [(F (1)⇒ F (A))∩(F (1)⇒ F (B))] = [F (A)∩F (B)]
are not equal. There are many such arrangements. For instance, take X = N,
f(n) = ⌊n
2
⌋ and A = 2N and B = 2N + 1 as the set of even and odd
natural numbers, respectively. Then A ∩ B = ∅ and hence f [A ∩ B] = ∅,
while 0 ∈ f [A] ∩ f [B]. This example provides an implication that does not
internalize the monoidal structure.
5 Non-Commutative Spacetimes
As we have discussed in Section 3, quantales provide a natural formalization
for a more subjective notion of intuitionistic proposition. However, to address
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the full intuitionistic picture, along the constructibility formalized by the
order, we also need to formalize the independent notion of time. How can
we formalize such a temporal structure? The answer is the modality ∇ that
we introduced in the Introduction. Recall that ∇a must be read as the
proposition “a hold at some point in the past”.
Definition 5.1. A pair S = (X,∇) is called a non-commutative spacetime if
X is a quantale and ∇ : X→ X is an oplax geometric map, i.e., a monotone
and join preserving map such that ∇e ≤ e and ∇(a⊗ b) ≤ ∇a⊗∇b, for all
a, b ∈ X. A non-commutative spacetime is called a spacetime if its monoidal
structure is a meet structure. Spelling out, S = (X,∇) is a spacetime if X is
a locale and ∇ : X → X is just a join preserving map. Note that the oplax
condition is a consequence of monotonicity of ∇ and the fact that 1 is the
greatest element.
Remark 5.2. Our notion of spacetime is similar to dynamic topological
spaces studied in [28]. However, in spacetimes, we are interested in the
combination of both adjoints rather than the  as the right adjoint of ∇,
alone. Moreover, we depart from topological spaces and the inverse image
of continuous functions to quantales and oplax join preserving maps. The
latter is extremely more general than the former.
Example 5.3. Assume that X is a topological space and f : X → X is a
continuous function. Then S = (O(X), f−1) is a spacetime where O(X) is
the locale of the open subsets of X .
Example 5.4. By a Kripke frame, we mean a tuple K = (W,≤, R) where
(W,≤) is a poset and R ⊆ W ×W is a relation compatible with the order
≤, meaning that for all u, v, u′, v′ ∈ W , if (u, v) ∈ R, u′ ≤ u and v ≤ v′ then
(u′, v′) ∈ R. For any Kripke frame K, define ∇K : U(W,≤) → U(W,≤) as
∇K(U) = {v ∈ W |∃u ∈ U R(u, v)}. The map ∇K is trivially monotone and
join preserving. For the latter, note that w ∈
⋃
i∈I ∇Ui iff ∃i ∈ I (w ∈ ∇Ui)
iff
∃i ∈ I∃u ∈ W ((u, w) ∈ R ∧ (u ∈ Ui))
iff ∃u ∈ W (u ∈
⋃
i∈I
Ui ∧ (u, w) ∈ R) iff w ∈ ∇(
⋃
i∈I
Ui).
Therefore, SK = (U(W,≤),∇K) is a spacetime. Note that if we take equality
=W for ≤, it transform any usual Kripke frame (W,R) with arbitrary R
to a spacetime. Philosophically speaking, in an arbitrary Kripke frame, W
can be interpreted as the set of the creative subject’s mental states, ≤ as
the encoding of the order on the knowledge content of states and R as the
encoding of the order of time of the states.
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Example 5.5. LetX be a set, f : X → X be a function and P (X×X) be the
quantale of all binary relations over X . Consider f! : P (X×X)→ P (X×X)
defined as f!(R) = {(f(x), f(y))|x, y ∈ X and (x, y) ∈ R}. By Example 2.18,
the map f! is an oplax geometric morphism and hence (P (X,X), f!) is a
non-commutative spacetime.
Example 5.6. Let M = (M,⊗, e) be a monoid, I(M) be the quantale of
its left ideals and f : M → M be an endomorphism. Consider f! : I(M) →
I(M) defined as f!(I) = Mf [I] = {mf(i)|i ∈ I,m ∈ M}. By Example
2.19, the map f! is an oplax geometric morphism and hence (I(M), f!) is a
non-commutative spacetime.
Any non-commutative spacetime has its own canonical implication. It is
constructible via the second method we have explained before. This impli-
cation is nothing but the usual implication, delayed by the passage of time.
The main point of these canonical implications is the full adjunctions that
they present. This means that the structure is complete enough to fully cap-
ture the behaviour of the implication. We will explain these matters more
later.
Theorem 5.7. Let S = (X,∇) be a non-commutative spacetime. Then there
exists an implication →S : Xop × X→ X such that
a⊗∇b ≤ c iff b ≤ a→ c
Proof. Since X is a quantale and ∇ : X → X is a join preserving monotone
map, by the adjoint functor theorem, Theorem 2.6, it has a right adjoint
 : X → X. Now, define a →S b = (a ⇒ b) where ⇒ is the canonical
implication of X. This map has the desired property since
a⊗∇b ≤ c iff ∇b ≤ a⇒ c iff b ≤ (a⇒ c)
Moreover, note that  is the right adjoint of ∇. Therefore, since ∇ is oplax,
by Theorem 2.9,  must be lax monoidal and hence by the second construc-
tion method for implications, the operation →S must be an implication.
It is worth defining an elementary version of the previous adjunction
situation. This is similar to how Heyting algebras provide an elementary
version of locales:
Definition 5.8. Let (A,≤,⊗, e) be a monoidal poset and ∇ : A → A and
→: Aop × A → A be two order preserving functions. Then the structure
A = (A,≤,⊗, e,∇,→) is called a temporal algebra if for any a, b, c ∈ A, we
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have a ⊗ ∇b ≤ c iff b → a → c. A temporal algebra is called distributive if
(A,≤,⊗, e) is a distributive monoidal poset. A temporal algebra is called a
left residuated algebra if∇ = id. And finally, ifA = (A,≤A,⊗A, eA,∇A,→A)
and B = (B,≤B,⊗B, eB,∇B,→B) are two temporal algebras, by a temporal
algebra morphism we mean a strict monoidal map f : A → B that also
preserves ∇ and→, i.e., f∇A = ∇Bf and f((−)→A (−)) = f(−)→B f(−).
Interpreting a temporal algebra A = (A,≤,⊗, e,∇,→) as the world of
propositions and ∇a as “a happened at some point before”, we claim that
moving from the set A to ∇[A] = {∇a|a ∈ A} and changing → to ∇(→),
forgets the time structure and results in a usual left residuated algebra. The
reason is that the only role that the time structure plays is delaying the
implication. If we apply ∇ on the implication, it almost brings it back to
the original timeless implication. It is almost, because moving in time and
coming back, ∇, is not a real identity, but it is its best approximation.
However, if we move from A to ∇[A], this approximation becomes the real
equality. In this sense we can claim that a temporal algebra (with meet
structure for the monoidal part) is a refined version of the usual left residual
algebra (Heyting algebra).
Theorem 5.9. Let A = (A,≤,⊗, e,∇,→) be a temporal algebra and ∇
preserves all finite multiplications. Then, the structure ∇A = (∇[A],≤
,⊗, e,∇,→′) is a left residuated algebra where ∇[A] = {∇x|x ∈ A} and
a→′ b = ∇(a→ b), for any a, b ∈ ∇[A]. Moreover, if A is finitely complete
(finitely cocomplete), so is ∇A. The same is also true for completeness. Fi-
nally, if the monoidal structure of A is the meet structure, ∇A is a Heyting
algebra.
Proof. Since ∇ preserves the monoidal structure, the set ∇[A] is closed under
all finite multiplications. Therefore, the only thing to prove is the adjunc-
tion a ⊗ (−) ⊣ (a →′ (−)), for any a ∈ ∇[A]. It means a ⊗ b ≤ c iff
b ≤ ∇(a→ c), for all a, b, c ∈ ∇[A]. From left to right, since b ∈ ∇[A], there
exists b′ ∈ A such that b = ∇b′. Since a ⊗ ∇b′ ≤ c we have b′ ≤ a → c
which implies b = ∇b′ ≤ ∇(a→ c). From right to left, if b ≤ ∇(a→ c) then
a⊗ b ≤ a⊗∇(a→ c) ≤ c.
Note that if A has also all (finite) joins or all (finite) meets, so does ∇[A].
For joins, since ∇ has a right adjoint and preserves all joins, ∇[A] is closed
under all (finite) joins. Therefore, ∇[A] has also all (finite) joins. For meet,
the situation is a bit more complex. We will address the binary meet. The
rest is similar. For any a, b ∈ ∇[A], we claim that ∇(a ∧ b) ∈ ∇[A] is the
meet of a and b in ∇A. Because, ∇(a ∧ b) ≤ (a ∧ b) ≤ a and similarly for
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b we also have ∇(a ∧ b) ≤ b . If for some c ∈ ∇[A] we have c ≤ a and
c ≤ b, then c ≤ a ∧ b and hence ∇c ≤ ∇(a ∧ b). Since c ∈ ∇[A], there
exists c′ ∈ A such that c = ∇c′. Hence, ∇c = ∇∇c′ = ∇c′ = c. Thus,
c ≤ ∇(a ∧ b).
Definition 5.10. Let S = (X,∇S) and T = (Y,∇T ) be two non-commutative
spacetimes. By a geometric map f : S → T , we mean a strict geometric mor-
phism f : X → Y such that f∇S = ∇T f . A geometric map is called logical
if it also preserves the implication, i.e., f [(−)→S (−)] = f(−)→T f(−).
Example 5.11. Let K = (W,=W , R) and L = (V,=V , S) be two Kripke
frames. A map p : W → V is called a p-morphism if (u, v) ∈ R implies
(p(u), p(v)) ∈ S, for any u, v ∈ W and for any w ∈ W and s, t ∈ V if p(w) = s
and (s, t) ∈ S, then there exists u ∈ W such that p(u) = t and (w, u) ∈ R.
A map p : W → V is a p-morphism iff p−1 : SLop → SKop is a geometric
morphism, where Kop = (W,Rop) and (v, u) ∈ Rop iff (u, v) ∈ R and similarly
for L. We only prove the left to right direction. The other direction is
similar. First note that p−1 preserves all unions and all finite intersections.
Therefore, the only thing we have to prove is the preservability of ∇, i.e.,
p−1∇Lop = ∇Kopp−1. Let U be a subset of V . Then if u ∈ ∇Kopp−1(U), then
there exists w ∈ W such that (w, u) ∈ Rop or equivalently (u, w) ∈ R and
p(w) ∈ U . Since p is a p-morphism we have (p(u), p(w)) ∈ S which means
(p(w), p(u)) ∈ Sop. Hence, p(u) ∈ ∇Lop(U) which implies u ∈ p−1∇Lop(U).
Conversely, if u ∈ p−1∇Lop(U), we have p(u) ∈ ∇Lop(U) from which, there
exists v ∈ U such that (v, p(u)) ∈ Sop or equivalently (p(u), v) ∈ S. Since
p is a p-morphism, there exists w ∈ W such that p(w) = v and (u, w) ∈ R.
Hence, (w, u) ∈ Rop from which, u ∈ ∇Kop(p−1(U)).
Theorem 5.12. Let S and T be two non-commutative spacetimes and f :
S → T be a geometric morphism with a left adjoint f!. Then f is logical iff
f!(fb⊗∇T a) = b⊗∇Sf!a.
Proof. Using the adjunctions x⊗∇T (−) ⊣ x→T (−), y⊗∇S(−) ⊣ y →S (−)
and f! ⊣ f we have
f!(fb⊗∇T a) ≤ c iff fb⊗∇T a ≤ fc iff a ≤ fb→T fc
and
b⊗∇Sf!a ≤ c iff f!a ≤ b→S c iff a ≤ f(b→S c)
These equivalences imply exactly what we wanted. Because, if f!(fb⊗∇T a) =
b ⊗ ∇Sf!a, then the left hand sides of the above lines are equivalent which
implies the equivalence of the right hand sides from which fb →T fc =
f(b→S c). The converse is similar.
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Sometimes, it would be reasonable to investigate the pure spatial be-
haviour of a non-commutative space, meaning the properties that hold for
all possible time structures or more formally all possible ∇’s over a fixed
space. The following theorem provides a method to transfer these properties
along certain geometric morphisms. We will use this theorem when we have
a suitable syntax for non-commutative spacetimes to formally address what
we mean by a “property”.
Corollary 5.13. Let S = (X,∇S) be a non-commutative spacetime, Y be a
quantale and f : X → Y be a strict geometric embedding with a left adjoint
f!. Then there exists ∇ on Y such that T = (Y,∇) is a non-commutative
spacetime and f : S → T is a logical morphism.
Proof. Define ∇ = f∇Sf!. Since f! is a left adjoints and both f and ∇S
preserves all joins, the operator ∇ is also join preserving. Moreover, since f
is strict monoidal, its left adjoint, f! is oplax, by Theorem 2.9. Therefore, ∇
as a composition of three oplax monoidal maps is also oplax. To prove the
geometricity of f : (X,∇S)→ (Y,∇), since f! ⊣ f , by Remark 2.5, ff!f = f .
Since f is an embedding we have f!f = id. Therefore, ∇f = f∇Sf!f =
f∇S . Hence f : (X,∇S) → (Y,∇) is geometric. To prove it is logical, by
Theorem 5.12 we have to show that f!(∇a ⊗ fb) = f!(f∇Sa ⊗ fb). Since f
is strict monoidal, the right hand side is equivalent to f!f(∇Sa ⊗ b). Since
f!f = id, the latter is equivalent to ∇Sf!a ⊗ b. Hence, the geometric map
f : (X,∇S)→ (Y,∇) is logical.
Corollary 5.13 is useful in case the quantales are the open posets of topo-
logical spaces and the space for X is an Alexandroff space. Recall that a
topological space is Alexandroff if any arbitrary intersection of its open sub-
sets is also open.
Corollary 5.14. Let X be a topological space, Y be an Alexandroff space,
f : X → Y be a continuous surjection and S = (O(Y ),∇Y ) be a spacetime.
Then there exists ∇X : O(X) → O(X) such that T = (O(X),∇X) is a
spacetime and f−1 : S → T is a logical morphism.
Proof. Since the space Y is Alexandroff, O(Y ) is closed under all intersec-
tions. Therefore, since f−1 preserves arbitrary intersections it also preserves
arbitrary meets. Hence, by the adjoint functor theorem, Theorem 2.6, it
has a left adjoint f!. Moreover, note that f : X → Y is surjective which
means that f−1 : O(Y ) → O(X) is an embedding. Hence, it is enough to
use Corollary 5.13.
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6 Representation Theorems
In this section we will present some quantale-based representations for dif-
ferent classes of strong algebras. The main motive is embedding an abstract
strong algebra in a quantale in a way that the implication presents a possible
well-behaved left adjunction. We call this process resolving the implication.
In a technical sense, these left adjoints make the implications easier to handle
as it is usual all over mathematics. However, resolutions have a very philo-
sophical role, as well. We know that adjunctions are the algebraic term for
the usual proof theoretical situation in which we have a pair of introduction
and elimination rules for a logical connective that we try to capture. For
instance, think about the intuitionistic implication and its natural deduction
rules. Following Gentzen, a connective is fully captured if it enjoys a pair
of introduction and elimination rules. In this sense, resolving an implication
is an attempt to fully identify an abstract implication as a logical connective.
Having all said, resolving all the implications is unfortunately impossi-
ble. We will explain the reason later. We will also see some necessary and
partially sufficient conditions to make resolutions possible. But first let us
begin by a general yet weak resolution-type result. We will prove that any
strong algebra is embeddable in a quantale equipped with an implication.
The implication is not necessarily a non-commutative spacetime implication
but it is a substitution of it. We can think of the implication as the result
of the application of the two construction methods that we explained before,
applied on the canonical implication of the quantale.
Let A = (A,≤,⊗, e,→) be a strong algebra. A priory, there is no reason
to assume that the structure A has the power (enough elements or structure)
to resolve the implication and find an adjunction-type situation. However,
if we extend the domain to also include the relative elements, meaning the
monotone functions Aop → A, then we can provide the following characteri-
zation for the implication:
c ≤ a→ b iff (x→ a)⊗ c ≤ (x→ b)
where x is a variable and the right-hand side consists of the functions for
which the order and the monoidal structure are both defined pointwise. The
reason is simple. From left to right, note that
c ≤ a→ b implies (x→ a)⊗ c ≤ (x→ b)⊗ (a→ b) ≤ (x→ b)
and from right to left, it is enough to put x = a to have
c = e⊗ c ≤ (a→ a)⊗ c ≤ a→ b
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Note that while this adjunction-type characterization handles all the elements
of A, it can not handle the functions that it adds. To solve this problem we
simply need infinitely many of such variables:
Theorem 6.1. For any strong algebra A there exists a non-commutative
spacetime S = (X,∇), a monotone map F : X → X and a strict monoidal
embedding i : A → X such that i(a→A b) = F (i(a))→S F (i(b)).
Proof. Define E as the set of all monotone functions f : (Πn∈NA
op) → A
with finite support, i.e., all order preserving maps that depend only on some
finitely many of their arguments. Define ≤E as the pointwise order on E and
use ⊗E and eE to represent the pointwise monoidal structure of E. Then the
structure E = (E,≤E ,⊗E , eE) is clearly a monoidal poset. Define j : A → E
by mapping any elemnt a ∈ A to the constant function with the value a.
Since the structure of E is defined pointwise, it is clear that j is a strict
monoidal embedding.
Define s : E → E as the coordinate shift map by f(~xn) 7→ f(~xn+1).
This map is clearly strictly monoidal. Moreover, define l : E → E mapping
f(~xn) 7→ (x0 → f(~xn+1)). Now use the downset completion on E = (E,≤E
,⊗E , eE) to construct our X. Let k : E → X be the canonical strict monoidal
embedding from the downset completion. Define
∇I = s! = {f ∈ E|∃g ∈ I (f ≤E s(g))}
and
F (I) = {f ∈ E|∃g ∈ I [f ≤E l(s(g))]}
The map F is clearly monotone and mapping downsets to downsets. By The-
orem 2.22, ∇ preserves the joins and it is oplax because s is oplax. Therefore,
S = (X,∇) is a non-commutative spacetime. We claim that i = kj : A → X
is the strict monoidal embedding that we are looking for. The only thing to
prove is that i(a→A b) = F (i(a))→S F (i(b)). To prove that, we show
J ⊆ i(a→ b) iff F (i(a))⊗∇J ⊆ F (i(b)), (∗)
for any downset J of E. First to simplify the proof, note that for any c ∈ A
f ∈ F (i(c)) iff f ≤ (x0 → c)
The reason is that f ∈ F (i(c)) iff there exists a function f ′ ∈ i(c) such that
f ≤ (x0 → s(f ′)). This is equivalent to f ≤ (x0 → c).
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Now to prove (∗), for left to right, if J ⊆ i(a→ b) and f ∈ F (i(a))⊗∇J
by the definition of the multiplication on downsets, there exist g ∈ F (i(a))
and h ∈ ∇J such that f ≤ g ⊗E h. By the above point, since g ∈ F (i(a))
we have g ≤ (x0 → a). By definition of ∇ there exists h′ ∈ J such that
h ≤ s(h′). Since h′ ∈ J ⊆ i(a → b) we have h′ ≤ a → b and hence
h ≤ s(a→ b) = a→ b. Therefore, g ⊗E h ≤ (x0 → a)⊗E (a→ b) ≤ x0 → b.
Therefore, by the above-mentioned point we have g⊗E h ∈ F (i(b)) and since
f ≤ g ⊗E h and F (i(b)) is a downset, we have f ∈ F (i(b)).
For the converse, assume F (i(a)) ⊗ ∇J ⊆ F (i(b)) and we want to show
that J ⊆ i(a → b). Assume f ∈ J . Then by the definition of ∇, we
have s(f) ∈ ∇J . Moreover, by the above mentioned point we have (x0 →
a) ∈ F (i(a)). Hence, (x0 → a) ⊗E s(f) ∈ F (i(a)) ⊗X ∇J . Therefore,
(x0 → a)⊗E s(f) ∈ F (i(b)). Hence, (x0 → a)⊗E s(f) ≤ (x0 → b). Since the
order of E is pointwise, put x0 = a and keep the other variables intact. Since
s(f) does not depend on x0, it does not change after the substitution. Hence,
(a → a) ⊗E s(f) ≤ (a → b). Since e ≤ a → a, we have s(f) ≤ a → b =
s(a→ b). Since s is an embedding, f ≤ a→ b and hence f ∈ i(a→ b).
Although, the previous theorem provides a weak resolution for any ab-
stract implication, it can only resolve it up to a factor F which breaks the full
adjunction situation. This F is inevitable, simply because it is impossible
to embed any implication into a non-commutative spacetime. The reason is
that for any non-commutative spacetime S = (X,∇), its implication, →S ,
internalizes the closed monoidal structure of S, i.e., for all a, b, c ∈ X we have
a→S b ≤ c⊗ a→S c⊗ b
because by the associativity and the adjunction
c⊗ a⊗∇(a→S b) ≤ c⊗ b
Therefore, if we seek an embedding into a non-commutative spacetime we
have to restrict our domain to the implications that internalize their monoidal
structure. Unfortunately, we do not know if this necessary condition is also
sufficient. However, if the multiplication has left residuation and the impli-
cation internalizes the closed monoidal structure, we will have the following
representation. Here our main ingredient is the ternary frames introduced
first in [42] as the Kripke models for the relevant logics.
Theorem 6.2. For any strong algebra A whose multiplication has left resid-
ual and A internalizes its closed monoidal structure, there exists a non-
commutative spacetime S = (X,∇) and a strong algebra embedding i : A →
S.
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Proof. Recall that U(A) is the poset of all upsets of A with inclusion. De-
fine R as a ternary relation over U(A) as: (P,Q,R) ∈ R iff for all a, b ∈ A
if a → b ∈ P and a ∈ Q then b ∈ R. Note that the relation R is
order-reversing in its first two arguments while it is order preserving in
its third argument. Consider X = U(U(A)) and i : A → X by defining
i(a) = {P ∈ U(A)| a ∈ P}. As we have observed in Preliminaries, this i is
clearly a strict monoidal embedding. Our strategy is first defining an impli-
cation on X and showing how i maps the implication of A to this implication
and then finding an oplax∇ such thatX⊗∇(−) ⊣ (X → (−)) for anyX ∈ X.
For any upsets of U(A) such as X and Y define X → Y as:
{P ∈ U(A)| ∀Q,R ∈ U(A), if (P,Q,R) ∈ R and Q ∈ X then R ∈ Y }
Since R is order-reversing in its first argument, X → Y is an upset. To
prove that i maps the implication of A into this implication, i.e., i(a→ b) =
i(a)→ i(b), we need to address the following two directions:
For i(a → b) ⊆ i(a) → i(b), if P ∈ i(a → b) then a → b ∈ P . To show
that P ∈ i(a) → i(b), assume for some Q,R ∈ U(A) we have (P,Q,R) ∈ R
and Q ∈ i(a). Then by the definition of i we have a ∈ Q and since a→ b ∈ P ,
by the definition of R we have b ∈ R implying R ∈ i(b). Conversely, for
i(a) → i(b) ⊆ i(a → b), if P ∈ i(a) → i(b) define Q = {x ∈ A|x ≥ a} and
R = {y ∈ A|a→ y ∈ P}. We have (P,Q,R) ∈ R because if x→ y ∈ P and
x ∈ Q then x ≥ a and hence x → y ≤ a → y which implies a → y ∈ P .
Therefore, by definition y ∈ R. Finally, Since a ∈ Q we have Q ∈ i(a) and
since (P,Q,R) ∈ R we have R ∈ i(b) which implies b ∈ R. By definition of
R it means that a→ b ∈ R.
To complete the proof, we have to introduce an oplax ∇ and show that
for any upsets of U(A) such as X, Y, Z we have X ⊆ Y → Z iff Y ⊗∇X ⊆ Z.
Define ∇ as:
∇X = {R ∈ U(A)| ∃P,Q ∈ U(A) [(P,Q,R) ∈ R, (P ∈ X) and (e ∈ Q)]}
Since R is order-preserving in its third argument, ∇ is an upset. To prove
the adjunction condition and the fact that it is oplax, we need a claim first:
(i) For any upsets P,Q,R, S ∈ U(A), if (P,Q,R) ∈ R then (P, S⊗Q, S⊗
R) ∈ R.
(ii) For any upsets P,Q,R ∈ U(A), if (P,Q,R) ∈ R then (P,E,Q⇒ R) ∈
R where E = {x ∈ A|x ≥ e} and ⇒ is the canonical implication of the
quantale U(A).
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(iii) For any upsets P1, P2, Q,R ∈ U(A), if (P1 ⊗ P2, Q,R) ∈ R and e ∈ Q,
then there are upsets Q1, Q2, R1, R2 ∈ U(A) such that e ∈ Q1, e ∈ Q2,
(P1, Q1, R1) ∈ R, (P2, Q2, R2) ∈ R and R1 ⊗ R2 ⊆ R.
Proof of the Claim. For (i), if x → y ∈ P and x ∈ S ⊗ Q then there are
z ∈ S, w ∈ Q such that x ≥ z⊗w. Since x ≥ z⊗w and x→ y ∈ P we have
z ⊗ w → y ∈ P . Since, A internalizes its closed monoidal structure we have
z ⊗ w → x ≤ w → (z ⇒A x)
where ⇒A is the left residual of multiplication in A. Since P is an upset,
w → (z ⇒A x) ∈ P . Since (P,Q,R) ∈ R and w ∈ Q we have z ⇒A x ∈ R.
Since z ∈ S and z ⊗ (z ⇒A x) ≤ x we have x ∈ S ⊗R.
For (ii), assume x → y ∈ P and x ≥ e then we have to show that
y ∈ Q⇒ R. Equivalently, it means Y ⊆ Q⇒ R where Y = {x ∈ A|x ≥ y}.
The latter is equivalent to Q ⊗ Y ⊆ R because ⇒ is the left residual in
U(A). Assume z ∈ Q⊗Y . Therefore, there exist w ∈ Q and u ≥ y such that
z ≥ w ⊗ u implying z ≥ w ⊗ y. Since A internalizes its monoidal structure,
we have
x→ y ≤ w ⊗ x→ w ⊗ y
Hence, w ⊗ x → w ⊗ y ∈ P . Since e ≤ x we have w = w ⊗ e ≤ w ⊗ x. By
w ∈ Q we have w ⊗ x ∈ Q. Since (P,Q,R) ∈ R we have w ⊗ y ∈ R. Since
z ≥ w ⊗ y we conclude z ∈ R that completes the proof.
To prove (iii), if (P1 ⊗ P2, Q,R) ∈ R and e ∈ Q, then define Q1 = Q2 =
{x ∈ A|x ≥ e} and Ri = {x ∈ A|e→ x ∈ Pi} for i ∈ {1, 2}. By definition it
is clear that (P1, Q1, R1) ∈ R and (P2, Q2, R2) ∈ R, because if u → v ∈ Pi
and u ≥ e then e → v ∈ Pi which by definition means v ∈ Ri. Finally, to
prove R1 ⊗ R2 ⊆ R, assume z ∈ R1 ⊗ R2. Therefore, there are x ∈ R1 and
y ∈ R2 such that z ≥ x⊗y. Since x ∈ R1 and y ∈ R2 we have e→ x ∈ P1 and
e → y ∈ P2. Therefore, (e → x) ⊗ (e → y) ∈ P1 ⊗ P2. Since A internalizes
its monoidal structure we have
e→ y ≤ (x⊗ e→ x⊗ y) = (x→ x⊗ y)
Therefore,
(e→ x)⊗ (e→ y) ≤ (e→ x)⊗ (x→ x⊗ y) ≤ e→ x⊗ y
Hence, e → x ⊗ y ∈ P1 ⊗ P2. Since e ∈ Q and (P,Q,R) ∈ R we have
x⊗ y ∈ R and since z ≥ x⊗ y we have z ∈ R.
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Now let us come back to prove that ∇ is a join preserving oplax map. We
have to show that ∇i(e) ⊆ i(e) and for any upsets of U(A) such as X, Y we
have ∇(X ⊗ Y ) ⊆ ∇X ⊗∇Y . For the first one, if R ∈ ∇i(e), by definition
there exist upsets P and Q such that (P,Q,R) ∈ R, e ∈ Q and P ∈ i(e).
Therefore, e ∈ P . Since e ≤ e, we have e ≤ e → e. Since P is an upset we
have e→ e ∈ P . Then since e ∈ Q and (P,Q,R) ∈ R we have e ∈ R which
means that R ∈ i(e). For ∇(X ⊗ Y ) ⊆ ∇X ⊗ ∇Y , assume R ∈ ∇(X ⊗ Y )
then again by definition there exist upsets P ∈ X ⊗ Y and Q such that
e ∈ Q and (P,Q,R) ∈ R. Since P ∈ X ⊗ Y , there are P1 ∈ X and P2 ∈ Y
such that P1 ⊗ P2 ⊆ P . Since R is order reversing in its first argument and
(P,Q,R) ∈ R we have (P1 ⊗ P2, Q,R) ∈ R. By the part (iii) of the claim,
there are upsets Q1, Q2, R1, R2 such that e ∈ Q1, e ∈ Q2, (P1, Q1, R1) ∈ R
and (P2, Q2, R2) ∈ R and R1 ⊗ R2 ⊆ R. Hence, by definition R1 ∈ ∇X
and R2 ∈ ∇Y and since R1 ⊗ R2 ⊆ R we have R ∈ ∇X ⊗ ∇Y . Therefore,
∇(X ⊗ Y ) ⊆ ∇X ⊗∇Y .
For the adjunction conditions, i.e., X ⊆ Y → Z iff Y ⊗∇X ⊆ Z, we need
to address the following two directions. For left to right, if X ⊆ Y → Z and
P ∈ Y ⊗∇X we have to show that P ∈ Z. Since P ∈ Y ⊗∇X , by definition
there exist Q,R such that Q ⊗ R ⊆ P and Q ∈ Y and R ∈ ∇X . Again by
definition since R ∈ ∇X there exist P ′, Q′ such that (P ′, Q′, R) ∈ R, P ′ ∈ X
and e ∈ Q′. Since e ∈ Q′ for any q ∈ Q we have q = q ⊗ e ∈ Q⊗Q′. There-
fore, Q ⊆ Q⊗Q′. Since Q ∈ Y we have Q ⊗Q′ ∈ Y . Since (P ′, Q′, R) ∈ R
by the part (i) of the Claim, we have (P ′, Q ⊗ Q′, Q ⊗ R) ∈ R and since
P ′ ∈ X ⊆ Y → Z and Q ⊗ Q′ ∈ Y , we have Q ⊗ R ∈ Z. Finally since Z is
an upset and Q⊗R ⊆ P we have P ∈ Z.
For right to left, if Y ⊗ ∇X ⊆ Z and P ∈ X we want to show that
P ∈ Y → Z. Pick Q and R such that (P,Q,R) ∈ R and Q ∈ Y . We have
to show that R ∈ Z. By the part (ii) of the Claim, since (P,Q,R) ∈ R we
have (P,E,Q ⇒ R) ∈ R where e ∈ E. Hence, by definition of ∇, we have
Q⇒ R ∈ ∇X and hence Q⊗ (Q⇒ R) ∈ Y ⊗∇X . Since Y ⊗∇X ⊆ Z we
have Q⊗ (Q⇒ R) ∈ Z. Finally, since Q⊗ (Q⇒ R) ⊆ R and Z is an upset
we have R ∈ Z.
Fortunately, if the monoidal structure is just the meet structure, it is
possible to show that the internalization of the monoidal structure is sufficient
for resolution. Moreover, it is possible to show that the quantale is actually
a locale or even better an Alexandroff space:
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Theorem 6.3. For any (distributive) strong algebra A = (A,≤,∧, 1,→) that
internalizes its monoidal structure [not necessarily its closed structure if it
has any] (and its join structure), there exists a Kripke frame K and a (join
preserving) strong algebra embedding i : A → SK. Moreover, if A is a reduct
of a (distributive) temporal algebra, i also preserves ∇.
Proof. See Section 8.
And finally, in case that we already have a nice left adjoint for the impli-
cation, it is possible to make the algebra cocomplete, preserving the temporal
structure. This will be useful later in topological completeness theorem.
Theorem 6.4. Let A = (A,≤,⊗, e,∇,→) be a (distributive) temporal alge-
bra. Then there exists a non-commutative spacetime S = (X,∇) and a (join
preserving) temporal algebra embedding i : A → S. Moreover, if A has all
finite meets, then i also preserves them.
Proof. See Section 7.
7 Logics of Spacetime
In the previous section we presented some methods to represent some classes
of implications via a diamond-type modality ∇, encoding the abstract notion
of time. In this section we bring the adjunction into the syntax of logic to pro-
vide a more expressible language to address non-standard weak implications.
Later, we will see how this new language provides a conservative extension
for some weak implication logics including Visser-Ruitenburg’s basic logic.
However, the fully captured implications of these new logics make the non-
standard implications more suitable for foundational studies. We will present
an embedding of a fragment of full Lambek calculus (without element 0 and
right implication) into our logic and full intuitionistic logic into our logic
equipped with the structural rules. Therefore, the logics of spacetime can be
interpreted as a unification of sub-structural and sub-intuionistic logics.
Let L∇ be the usual language of propositional logic equipped with a new
unary modal operator∇. To introduce some formal systems in this language,
consider the following set of sequent-style rules in which the left side of a
sequent is a sequence of formulas:
Axioms:
A⇒ A ⇒ 1 ∇1⇒ 1 Γ⇒ ⊤ Γ,⊥,Σ⇒ A
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Cut:
Γ⇒ A Π, A,Σ⇒ B
cut
Π,Γ,Σ⇒ B
Conjunction Rules:
Γ, A,Σ⇒ C
L∧
Γ, A ∧ B,Σ⇒ C
Γ, B,Σ⇒ C
L∧
Γ, A ∧B,Σ⇒ C
Γ⇒ A Γ⇒ B
R∧
Γ⇒ A ∧ B
Disjunction Rules:
Γ, A,Σ⇒ C Γ, B,Σ⇒ C
L∨
Γ, A ∨ B,Σ⇒ C
Γ⇒ A
R∨
Γ⇒ A ∨ B
Γ⇒ B
R∨
Γ⇒ A ∨ B
Rule for 1:
Γ,Σ⇒ A
L1
Γ, 1,Σ⇒ A
Multiplication Rules:
Γ, A, B,Σ⇒ ∆
L⊗
Γ, A⊗B,Σ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ A Σ⇒ B R⊗
Γ,Σ⇒ A⊗B
Modal Rules:
A⇒ B
∇
∇A⇒∇B
∇A,∇B ⇒ C
Oplax
∇(A⊗ B)⇒ C
Implication Rules:
Γ⇒ A Π, B,Σ⇒ C
L→
Π,Γ,∇(A→ B),Σ⇒ C
A,∇Γ⇒ B
R→
Γ⇒ A→ B
Now define the logic of spacetime, STL, as the logic of the proof system
consisting of all the axioms, cut and propositional rules. The provability of
a sequent Γ⇒ A in STL is denoted by STL ⊢ Γ⇒ A or Γ ⊢STL A.
By the basic rule schemes {N,H, P, F, wF}, we mean one of the following
schemes:
Rule Schemes:
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Γ⇒ A
N
∇Γ⇒∇A
Γ⇒ ∇A
P
Γ⇒ A
Γ⇒ A
F
Γ⇒∇A
∇A⇒ ⊥
wF
A⇒ ⊥
Γ, {Ai → Bi}i∈I ⇒ C
H
∇Γ, {∇Ai →∇Bi}i∈I ⇒ ∇C
Also consider the structural rules:
Structural Rules:
Γ,Σ⇒ B
Lw
Γ, A,Σ⇒ B
Γ, A, A,Σ⇒ B
Lc
Γ, A,Σ⇒ B
Γ, A, B,Σ⇒ C
Le
Γ, B, A,Σ⇒ C
For any R ⊆ {N,H, P, F, wF}, by the logic STL(R) we mean the logic
of all rules of STL plus the rules of R. By iSTL(R) we mean STL(R)
with all structural rules. And finally we denote STL({P, F}) by FLl and
iSTL({P, F}) by IPC.
Remark 7.1. Note that in the presence of all the structural rules, the con-
nective ⊗ collapses to ∧ and the constant 1 is reduced to ⊤. Therefore, it is
possible to axiomatize the structural logics of spacetime by eliminating the
connective ⊗ and 1 from the language and the axiom⇒ 1 and the rules L⊗,
R⊗, L1 and Oplax from the system.
Remark 7.2. Note that in the presence of both (F ) and (P ), the connective
∇ trivializes to identity. Therefore, in such logics and more specifically in
FLl and IPC, it is possible to formalize the logics without the axiom∇1⇒ 1
and the rules∇ and Oplax, by eliminating∇ in the implication rules. In such
a situation, the implication rules become the usual left implication rules in
FL. This explains our terminology. In fact, our logic is exactly the fragment
of FL excluding the right implication and 0 from both the language and
the rules. For IPC, it is easy to see that the system becomes the original
system LJ for intuitionistic propositional logic if we forget the collapsed ⊗.
See Remark 7.1.
Remark 7.3. Note that the following sequents are provable in the system.
First ∇(A⊗ B)⇒∇A⊗∇B stating the oplax condition for ∇:
∇A⇒∇A ∇B ⇒∇B
⊗R
∇A,∇B ⇒∇A⊗∇B
Oplax
∇(A⊗ B)⇒ ∇A⊗∇B
Secondly, STL proves the distributivity of multiplication over disjunction,
on both sides, i.e., (A⊗ B) ∨ (A ⊗ C) ⇒ A⊗ (B ∨ C) and A ⊗ (B ∨ C) ⇒
(A⊗B)∨ (A⊗C). The first is a simple result of monotonicity of ⊗. For the
second:
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A,B ⇒ A⊗B
A,B ⊢ A⊗ B ∨A⊗ C
A,C ⇒ A⊗ C
A,C ⊢ A⊗B ∨A⊗ C
A, (B ∨ C) ⊢ A⊗B ∨A⊗ C
L⊗
A⊗ (B ∨ C) ⊢ A⊗B ∨A⊗ C
Thirdly, the system proves the sequent A⊗∇(A→ B)⇒ B:
A⇒ A B ⇒ B
L→
A,∇(A→ B)⇒ B
L⊗
A⊗∇(A→ B)⇒ B
Therefore, the sequents A,∇B ⇒ C and B ⇒ A→ C are equivalent. From
left to right is just one application of the rule R→. From right to left, by the
rule ∇, we have ∇B ⇒ ∇(A → C). Using cut with A,∇(A → C) ⇒ C we
reach what we wanted. Note that this adjunction situation simply implies
that ∇ preserves all disjunctions, i.e., ∇⊥ ⇒ ⊥, ∇(A∨B)⇒∇A∨∇B and
∇A ∨∇B ⇒∇(A ∨B). Fourthly, the system proves the sequent A→ B ⇒
C ⊗ A→ C ⊗ B:
C ⇒ C A,∇(A→ B)⇒ B
R⊗
C,A,∇(A→ B)⇒ C ⊗B
L⊗
C ⊗A,∇(A→ B)⇒ C ⊗ B
R→
A→ B ⇒ C ⊗A→ C ⊗ B
Remark 7.4. Note that the defined extensions of the system STL can be
also axiomatized with some axioms instead of rules. For (N) the axioms are
⇒ ∇1 and ∇A ⊗ ∇B ⇒ ∇(A ⊗ B). These are provable by the rule (N)
because:
⇒ 1
(N)
⇒∇1
A,B ⇒ A⊗ B
(N)
∇A,∇B ⇒ ∇(A⊗B)
L⊗
∇A⊗∇B ⇒ ∇(A⊗B)
The converse is also true. For the empty Γ, if ⇒ A, then by (L1), we have
1 ⇒ A. By ∇ we have ∇1 ⇒ ∇A. Hence, by ⇒ ∇1 we have ⇒ ∇A. For
Γ with at least one element, by induction, it is possible to use the axiom to
prove that
⊗
(∇Γ)⇒∇(
⊗
Γ). Hence,
⊗
(∇Γ)⇒ ∇(
⊗
Γ)
Γ⇒ A
L⊗⊗
Γ⇒ A
∇
∇(
⊗
Γ)⇒∇A
cut⊗
(∇Γ)⇒∇A
∇Γ⇒∇A
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where the double line means the existence of an easy omitted proof tree
there. Therefore, since ∇1 ⇒ 1 and ∇(A ⊗ B) ⇒ ∇A ⊗ ∇B are already
provable in STL without (N), the rule (N) just states the strictness of ∇,
i.e., for any sequence Γ, the sequents
⊗
(∇Γ) and ∇(
⊗
Γ) are equivalent.
This justifies the name of the rule, (N), that stands for normality, reflecting
the normality condition of the usual conjunction-preserving modalities. For
(H), note that this rule implies the rule (N) for I = ∅. It also implies that
∇A→∇B ⇒ ∇(A→ B) because:
A→ B ⇒ A→ B
H
∇A→∇B ⇒∇(A→ B)
Therefore, H implies (⇒∇1), (∇A⊗∇B ⇒∇(A⊗B)) and (∇A→ ∇B ⇒
∇(A → B)). These are enough to prove (H) because the first part implies
the rule (N) and then
{∇Ai → ∇Bi}i∈I ⇒
⊗
i∈I ∇(Ai → Bi)
Γ, {Ai → Bi}i∈I ⇒ C
(N)
∇Γ, {∇(Ai → Bi)}i∈I ⇒∇C
L⊗
∇Γ,
⊗
i∈I ∇(Ai → Bi)⇒∇C
∇
∇Γ, {∇Ai → ∇Bi}i∈I ⇒ ∇C
Moreover, in the presence of (H) we also have:
∇(A→ B), A⇒ B
(N)
∇∇(A→ B),∇A⇒∇B
R→
∇(A→ B)⇒∇A→ ∇B
Therefore, the rule (H) is equivalent to the strictness of∇ and the equivalence
between ∇(A→ B) and ∇A→ ∇B. We will see that these conditions when
applied on a locale of the open subsets of a topological space is equivalent
to the condition that ∇ be the inverse image of a homeomorphism. This
justifies the name of the rule, (H). For (P ) and (F ), they are equivalent to
∇A⇒ A and A⇒∇A, respectively. (P ) stands for past and (F ) for future,
reflecting the temporal nature of the modality ∇. We will see the details in
Section 8. Finally, (wF ) is equivalent to 1 → ⊥ ⇒ ⊥. It is provable via
(wF ) because
⇒ 1 1,∇(1→ ⊥)⇒ ⊥
cut
∇(1→ ⊥)⇒ ⊥
(wF )
1→ ⊥⇒ ⊥
Conversely, if we have the axiom 1→ ⊥⇒ ⊥, then
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∇A⇒ ⊥
L1
1,∇A⇒ ⊥
R→
A⇒ 1→ ⊥ 1→ ⊥⇒ ⊥
cut
A⇒ ⊥
In this rule, (wF ) stands for “weak future”, since the rule (F ) clearly implies
(wF ).
Definition 7.5. (Topological Semantics) Let S = (X,∇S) be a non-commutative
spacetime and V : L∇ → X an assignment. A tuple (S, V ) is called a topo-
logical model for the language L∇ if:
• V (1) = e, V (⊥) = 0 and V (⊤) = 1,
• V (A ∧ B) = V (A) ∧ V (B),
• V (A ∨ B) = V (A) ∨ V (B),
• V (A⊗ B) = V (A)⊗ V (B),
• V (∇A) = ∇SV (A),
• V (A→ B) = V (A)→S V (B).
We say (S, V )  Γ ⇒ A when
⊗
γ∈Γ V (γ) ≤ V (A) and S  Γ ⇒ A when
for all V , (S, V )  Γ⇒ A. For a class C of non-commutative spacetimes, we
write C  Γ⇒ A if for any S ∈ C we have S  Γ⇒ A. Moreover, if for some
fixed X and for all (X,∇) in some class C we have (X,∇)  Γ⇒ A, we write
X C Γ ⇒ A. If X is O(X) for some topological space, we simplify it more
to X C Γ⇒ A. Furthermore, we omit the symbol ⇒ whenever Γ is empty.
Definition 7.6. Let A = (A,≤,⊗, e,→,∇) be atemporal algebra. Then for
any rule scheme R ∈ {N,H, P, F, wF}, we say A satisfies R if:
(N) ∇ preserves all finite multiplications,
(H) ∇ preserves all the structure including the implication,
(P ) For any a ∈ A we have ∇a ≤ a,
(F ) For any a ∈ A we have a ≤ ∇a,
(wF ) (If A has zero) for any a ∈ A, if ∇a = 0 then a = 0.
Definition 7.7. For any set of rule schemes R ⊆ {N,H, P, F, wF}, by the
class ST(R) we mean the class of all non-commutative sapcetimes (X,∇)
that satisfies all the rule schemes in R. The class iST(R) is defined similarly
for spacetimes, i.e., non-commutative spacetimes with locales.
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Remark 7.8. Note that the condition (H) implies that ∇ is an isomorphism
with the inverse  = e→ (−). The proof is the following. Since ∇e = e we
have
e→∇a = ∇e→∇a = ∇(e→ a)
but since ∇ ⊣ e → (−), we have ∇(e → a) ≤ a ≤ e → ∇a. Hence,
∇(e → a) = a = e → ∇a. This means that ∇ and  are inverses of each
other over A.
Remark 7.9. Note that for non-commutative spacetimes, the conditions
(N) and (H) are equivalent to “∇ is a strict geometric morphism” and “∇
is a strict geometric isomorphism”, respectively. The reason for the first one
is that ∇ has a right adjoint and hence preserves all joins. Hence, the only
geometricity condition is the preservation of multiplications. For the second,
we have to show that if ∇ is a geometric isomorphism, then it also preserves
the implication. Let S = (X,∇) be a non-commutative spacetime where ∇
is a strict geometric isomorphism. Then, to reduce the risk of confusion, let
us denote ∇ by f . We know that f has an inverse. Call it g. Since they
are inverses, we have g ⊣ f . Then since f preserves ∇, it can be seen as a
geometric map between non-commutative spaces, i.e., f : S → S. Finally, by
Theorem 5.12, to prove it is logical meaning that it respects the implication,
it is enough to check that g(fb⊗∇a) = b⊗∇ga. Since f = ∇ is strict and
gf = id = fg we have g(fb⊗ fa) = gf(b⊗ a) = b⊗ fga. Therefore, f = ∇
preserves the implication.
Theorem 7.10. (Soundness) For any set of rule schemesR ⊆ {N,H, P, F, wF},
if Γ ⊢STL(R) A then ST(R)  Γ ⇒ A. Specially, if Γ ⊢iSTL(R) A then
iST(R)  Γ⇒ A.
Proof. Since the logics are just the syntactical elementary representations of
the structure of the non-commutative spacetimes, the soundness theorem is
clear and we will leave the details to the reader. There are only four points to
make. First about the rule Oplax and the axiom ∇1 ⇒ 1. They are clearly
valid whenever the interpretation of ∇ is oplax. Hence, they are valid in our
topological interpretation. Secondly, consider the rule R →. If Γ⇒ A→ B
is proved by A,∇Γ ⇒ B, then by IH, for any non-commutative spacetime
S = (X,∇S) and any V : At(L∇) → X we have: V (A) ⊗
⊗
γ∈Γ∇SV (γ) ≤
V (B). Since ∇S is oplax, we have V (A) ⊗ ∇S(
⊗
γ∈Γ V (γ)) ≤ V (B). By
adjunction, we have
⊗
γ∈Γ V (γ) ≤ V (A)→S V (B). Therefore, the rule R→
is also valid. Thirdly, note that all the rule schemes are equivalent to some
axioms and those axioms are exactly the corresponding conditions on the
non-commutative spacetimes. Hence, their validity is evident. Finally, note
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that for the spacetimes ⊗ = ∧ and e = 1. Therefore, it is clear that all the
structural rules are valid.
To prove the completeness theorem, we need the Lindenbaum construc-
tion together with a completion technique. For the former, set L = ST(R).
Define B(L) to be the set of all formulas of the language L∇ with the equiv-
alence relation ≡ as A ≡ B iff L ⊢ A⇒ B and L ⊢ B ⇒ A. It is clear that
(B(L)/ ≡,⊢) is a monoidal poset with all finite meets and all finite joins.
Moreover it is also a distributive temporal algebra with its canonical ∇ and
→ such that [A] ⊗ ∇(−) is a left adjoint to [A] → (−). See Remark 7.3.
For the completion technique we have the following representation theorem,
presented in Section 6. Here we present it in a slightly stronger form to also
address the rule schemes.
Theorem 7.11. Let A = (A,≤A,⊗A, eA,∇A,→A) be a (distributive) tempo-
ral algebra. Then there exists a non-commutative spacetime S = (X,∇) and
a (join preserving) temporal algebra embedding i : A → S. Moreover, if the
algebra has all finite meets, i preserves them and if A satisfies a rule scheme
R ⊆ {N,H, P, F}, then so does S. The same is also true for (wF ) if A is
distributive.
Proof. First let us address the case in which the temporal algebra does not
necessarily have all the joins. Let X = D(A) be the downset completion of
A and define
∇I = (∇A)! = {x ∈ A|∃i ∈ I (x ≤ ∇Ai)}
First observe that ∇ maps downsets to downsets. Secondly, note that by
Theorem 2.22, ∇ is join preserving and since ∇A is oplax, (∇A)! is also oplax.
Therefore, ∇ has a right adjoint by adjoint functor theorem, Theorem 2.6.
Now let us provide the explicit adjoint. Define and
I → J = {x ∈ A| ∀i ∈ I (i⊗∇Ax ∈ J)}
Again observe that → maps downsets to downsets. Then note that for any
I ∈ X, the map I ⊗∇(−) ⊣ (I → (−)) because for any I, J,K ∈ X we have
I ⊗∇J ⊆ K iff I ⊆ J → K
For the left to right, note that if i ∈ I, then for any j ∈ J , we have
i ⊗ ∇j ∈ I ⊗ ∇J ⊆ K and hence i ⊗ ∇j ∈ K. Hence, I ⊆ J → K.
Conversely, if I ⊆ J → K and x ∈ I ⊗ ∇J , then there exist i ∈ I and
j ∈ J such that x ≤ i ⊗∇j. Since i ∈ I ⊆ J → K, by the definition of the
implication we have i⊗∇j ∈ K. Hence, x ∈ K.
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Finally, define i(a) = {x ∈ A|x ≤ a}. Then by Theorem 2.20, the map
i is a monoidal poset’s embedding that preserves finite meets (if they exist).
Moreover, by Theorem 2.22, i also preserves ∇ i.e., i∇Aa = ∇i(a), for any
a ∈ A. For implication:
i(a→ b) = {x ∈ A|x ≤ a→ b} = {x ∈ A|a⊗∇x ≤ b} =
{x ∈ A|∀y ≤ a (y ⊗∇x ≤ b)} = i(a)→ i(b)
Now, let us move to the distributive case. In this case, we have to move from
the downset completion to the ideal completion with the same monoidal
structure. By Theorem 2.22, since ∇ is join preserving so does (∇A)!. More-
over, the same i as before is a join preserving monoidal embedding that
respects ∇ and finite meets (if they exist). The only thing we have to check
is the stability of the ideals under the implication. This implies that the
previous proofs for adjunction I ⊗ ∇(−) ⊣ (I → (−)), for any ideal I and
preservability of implication under i work again. First note that 0 ∈ I → J
because for any i ∈ I, we have i⊗∇0 = i⊗0 = 0 ∈ J . The last equality is the
consequence of distributivity of A. And secondly, note that if x, y ∈ I → J ,
then for all i ∈ I, we have i⊗∇x ∈ J and i ⊗∇y ∈ J . Since J is an ideal,
∇ preserves joins and A is distributive, we have
[i⊗∇x] ∨ [i⊗∇y] = [i⊗∇(x ∨ y)] ∈ J
which proves that I → J is an ideal.
Finally, for the rule schemes, we have to show that the previous downset
or ideal construction respects the rule schemes. For all schemes, except (wF ),
it is enough to prove the scheme for all downsets. The scheme for the ideals
is just its special case.
For (N), note that ∇A is lax and hence by Theorem 2.22, (∇A)! is also
lax. Being lax is nothing but satisfying (N).
For (H), note that if A satisfies (H), by Remark 7.8, ∇ and  are in-
verses of each other over A. This fact lifts also to S. It is enough to prove
that for any ideal I, we have ∇I = I = ∇I. We prove I ⊆ ∇I. The
rest is similar. Assume i ∈ I, then i = ∇i. For the sake of readability, let
j = i. Then ∇j = i. We have j ∈ I because e⊗∇j = i ∈ I. Therefore,
i = ∇j ∈ ∇I. Finally, since ∇ has an inverse and is join preserving and
strict, it will be a strict geometric isomorphism. The claim follows from Re-
mark 7.9.
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For (P ), we have ∇I ⊆ I because if x ∈ ∇I, then there exists i ∈ I such
that x ≤ ∇i. Since ∇i ≤ i, we have x ≤ i ∈ I which implies x ∈ I. For
(F ), we have I ⊆ ∇I, because for any i ∈ I we have i ≤ ∇i which implies
i ∈ ∇I. Finally, for (wF ), if ∇I = {0} and i ∈ I, we have ∇i ∈ ∇I = {0}
which implies ∇i = 0. Since A satisfies (wF ), we have i = 0 that proves
I = {0}.
Theorem 7.12. (Completeness) For any rule schemeR ⊆ {N,H, P, F, wF},
there exists a non-commutative spacetime S ∈ ST(R) such that if S  Γ⇒ A
then Γ ⊢STL(R) A. The same is also true for iST(R) and iSTL(R).
Proof. Since the Lindenbaum algebra for STL(R) is clearly a finitely com-
plete distributive temporal algebra, by Theorem 7.11, there exists a non-
commutative spacetime S = (X,∇) and a finite meet and finite join pre-
serving temporal embedding i : B(L) → S. Define V (p) = i([p]). It is
easy to check that for all formula C ∈ L∇, we have V (C) = i([C]). Since
(S, V )  Γ ⇒ A we have
⊗
γ∈Γ V (γ) ≤ V (A). Hence,
⊗
γ∈Γ i([γ]) ≤ i([A]).
Since i preserves the monoidal structure and is an embedding,
⊗
γ∈Γ[γ] ≤ [A]
or equivalently Γ ⊢STLR) A. For the structural version, note that by Remark
2.21, the ideal construction in Theorem 7.11, applied on a monoidal poset
with meet structure as its monoidal structure, produces a locale for X.
One of the main advantages of the spacetime logics over the usual sub-
intuitionistic logics is their complete pairs of introduction-elimination rules.
This well-behaved nature may find some evidence by the following translation
that interprets the seemingly more powerful logics into the weaker ones. The
translation is the syntactical version of Theorem 5.9. It helps to import what
we have in sub-structural and intuitionistic tradition to the spacetime logics.
It also shows that STL and iSTL are in some sense more powerful that the
usual FLl and IPC, respectively. In this sense the former refine the timeless
spatial structure of the latter by bringing the more temporal and hence more
expressive power.
Definition 7.13. Define the translation (−)∇ : L → L∇ as the following,
where L = {∧,∨,⊤,⊥, 1,⊗,→}:
• p∇ = ∇p, ⊥∇ = ⊥, ⊤∇ = ∇⊤ and 1∇ = 1.
• (A ∧ B)∇ = ∇(A∇ ∧B∇).
• (A ∨ B)∇ = A∇ ∨ B∇.
• (A⊗ B)∇ = A∇ ⊗B∇.
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• (A→ B)∇ = ∇(A∇ → B∇).
Theorem 7.14. For any Γ ∪ {A} ⊆ L,
(i) Γ ⊢FLl A iff Γ
∇ ⊢STL(N) A∇.
(ii) Γ ⊢IPC A iff Γ∇ ⊢iSTL(N) A
∇. (Originally proved in [4].)
Proof. We will prove (i), the proof for (ii) is the same. For that matter, we
will first prove a claim that for any formula A ∈ L, there exists a formula
A′ ∈ L∇ such that A∇ ⊢STL(N) ∇A
′ and ∇A′ ⊢STL(N) A
∇. The proof for the
claim is by induction on the structure of A. For atomic cases, considering
the fact that ∇⊥ is equivalent to ⊥, there is nothing to prove. The claim for
conjunction and implication is clear by definition of the translation. Finally,
for ⊗ and ∨, note that the translation (−)∇ commutes with these connec-
tives. Therefore, if there exist A′ and B′ for A∇ and B∇, respectively, for
A ⊗ B it is enough to consider A′ ⊗ B′. The reason is that ∇ commutes
with ⊗ because of (N). For ∨ the same strategy works. Therefore, the ex-
istence of A′ is proved. This property implies the following useful fact: For
any B ∈ L∇, if Γ∇ ⊢STL(N) B, then Γ∇ ⊢STL(N) ∇B. The reason is the
following. Since the formula
⊗
Γ∇ is equivalent to (
⊗
Γ)∇ and the latter
is also equivalent to ∇C for some C ∈ L∇, it is enough to prove the claim
for ∇C. Now, since ∇C ⊢STL(N) B, by (L1) we have 1,∇C ⊢STL(N) B. By
implication introduction we have C ⊢STL(N) B and hence by the rule (∇),
we have ∇C ⊢STL(N) ∇B.
Coming back to the proof of the theorem, for the soundness part it is
enough to use an induction on the FLl-proof length of Γ ⇒ A. For axioms,
all cases are clear, except Γ⇒ ⊤. For this case we have to prove Γ∇ ⊢ ∇⊤
which is clear from what we observed above.
For the conjunction rule (R∧), assume Γ⇒ A∧B is proved via Γ⇒ A and
Γ⇒ B. Then by IH, we have Γ∇ ⇒ A∇ and Γ∇ ⇒ B∇. Then Γ∇ ⇒ A∇∧B∇.
Therefore, by what we have above Γ∇ ⇒ ∇(A∇ ∧ B∇). For the con-
junction rule (L∧), assume Γ, A ∧ B,Σ ⇒ C is proved via Γ, A,Σ ⇒ C.
Then by IH, Γ∇, A∇,Σ∇ ⇒ C∇. Then Γ∇, A∇ ∧ B∇,Σ∇ ⇒ C∇. Since
∇(A∇ ∧ B∇)⇒ A∇ ∧B∇, we have Γ∇, (A ∧ B)∇,Σ∇ ⇒ C∇.
For implication rule (R→), assume Γ⇒ A→ B is proved via A,Γ⇒ B.
Then by IH, we have A∇,Γ∇ ⇒ B∇. Since Γ∇ is equivalent to (
⊗
Γ)∇,
it is also equivalent to ∇C for some C. We have A∇,∇C ⇒ B∇. Hence,
C ⇒ (A∇ → B∇). Hence, by (∇) we have ∇C ⇒ ∇(A∇ → B∇). Since
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⊗
Γ∇ is equivalent to ∇C, we have Γ∇ ⇒ ∇(A∇ → B∇). For implica-
tion rule (L →), assume Π,Γ, (A → B),Σ ⇒ C is proved via Γ ⇒ A and
Π, B,Σ ⇒ C. Then by IH, Γ∇ ⇒ A∇ and Π∇, B∇,Σ∇ ⇒ C∇. Hence,
Π∇,Γ∇,∇(A∇ → B∇),Σ∇ ⇒ C∇.
For completeness, note that if Γ∇ ⇒ A∇ is provable in STL(N), then
it is also provable in the greater logic FLl = STL(N,P, F ). Since for any
B ∈ L, the formulas B∇ and B are equivalent in STL(N,P, F ), the sequent
Γ⇒ A is also provable in FLl.
8 Kripke Models
In this section we will focus on the structural logics of spacetime and their
Kripke semantics. This semantics is essentially the usual Kripke semantics
for the intuitionistic modal and implication logics [47], [46] and [30]. How-
ever, to also address ∇, we will add a natural forcing condition using the
same accessibility relation that the model uses for . In this sense, the
structural logics of spacetime are actually the result of a faithful extension
of the language and logics to have a better reflection of the Kripke models
into the pure syntax.
Definition 8.1. By a Kripke model for the language L∇, we mean a tuple
K = (W,≤, R, V ) where (W,≤) is a poset, R ⊆ W ×W is a relation over
W (not necessarily transitive or reflexive) compatible with ≤, i.e., for all
u, u′, v, v′ ∈ W if (u, v) ∈ R and u′ ≤ u and v ≤ v′ then (u′, v′) ∈ R and
V : At(L∇)→ U((W,≤)) where At(L∇) is the set of atomic formulas of L∇
and U((W,≤)) is the set of all upsets of (W,≤). Define the forcing relation
as usual using the relation R and for the ∇ let u  ∇A if there exists v ∈ W
such that (v, u) ∈ R and v  A. A Kripke model is called normal if there
exists an order preserving function π : W → W such that (u, v) ∈ R iff
u ≤ π(v). It is clear that if this π exists, it would be unique. Finally, a
sequent Γ⇒ A is valid in a Kripke model if for all w ∈ W , ∀B ∈ Γ (w  B)
implies w  A.
Lemma 8.2. (Monotonicity Lemma) For any formula A ∈ L∇, any Kripke
model K = (W,≤, R, V ) and any u, v ∈ W , if u ≤ v and u  A then v  A.
Proof. The proof is a routine induction on the structure of A. The only case
to mention is when A = ∇B. Then if u  ∇B, there exist u′ ∈ W such that
(u′, u) ∈ R and u′  B. Since u ≤ v and R is compatible with ≤, we have
(u′, v) ∈ R. Therefore, v  ∇A.
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Remark 8.3. Note that in a normal Kripke model w  ∇A iff π(w)  A.
One direction is clear, for the other, if there exists u ∈ W such that (u, w) ∈ R
and u  A, then since u ≤ π(w), by the monotonicity lemma we have
π(w)  A. This means that the normal Kripke models are the models in
which we have a canonical way to witness the existential quantifier in the
forcing condition of ∇.
Definition 8.4. For any rule scheme in the set {N,H, P, F, wF}, we define
a corresponding condition on a Kripke model as:
(N) The model is normal.
(H) The model is normal and its π is a poset isomorphism.
(P ) R ⊆ ≤. For a normal model, it is equivalent to ∀w ∈ W (π(w) ≤ w).
(F ) R is reflexive, i.e., for all w ∈ W we have (w,w) ∈ R. For a normal
model, it is equivalent to ∀w ∈ W (w ≤ π(w)).
(wF ) R is serial, i.e., for all u ∈ W there exists v ∈ W such that (u, v) ∈ R.
For a normal model, it is equivalent to ∀u ∈ W∃v ∈ W (u ≤ π(v)).
Moreover, if R ⊆ {N,H, P, F, wF}, by a K(R)-Kripke model we mean a
model satisfying the conditions corresponding to all the schemes in R.
Theorem 8.5. (Soundness) For any rule scheme R ⊆ {N,H, P, F, wF}, the
logic iSTL(R) is sound for all K(R)-Kripke models.
Proof. Our strategy is reducing the soundness for Kripke models to soundness
for topological models. It is also possible to prove it directly. However, we
follow this strategy to also show how Kripke models must be considered
as the special case of the topological models. For that purpose, we show
how to assign a topological model to a Kripke model with the same valid
sequents. Moreover, we will show that this construction respects the schema
conditions. Let K = (W,≤, R, V ) be a Kripke model. Define the spacetime
SK = (U(W,≤),∇K) as in Example 5.4 by
∇KP = {w ∈ W |∃u ∈ W [(u, w) ∈ R and u ∈ P ]}
For any formula B ∈ L∇ define [B] as the set {w ∈ W |w  B}. By the
monotonicity lemma, [B] is an upset of W . If we define the topological
valuation V¯ (p) = V (p), it is easy to see that V¯ (B) = [B] for any formula
B ∈ L∇. Hence, for any sequent Γ ⇒ A, it is valid in (U(W,≤),∇K, V¯ ) iff∧
γ∈Γ V¯ (γ) ⊆ V¯ (A) iff
⋂
γ∈Γ[γ] ⊆ [A] which is nothing but the validity of
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Γ⇒ A in K.
It is remaining to prove the preservation of the schema conditions. First note
that for (N), the existence of π means that∇K = π
−1. Therefore, ∇ preserves
all intersections and hence is a strict geometric map. For (H), since π is an
order isomorphism, it has an inverse ρ. Then π−1, ρ−1 : U(W,≤)→ U(W,≤)
are each other’s inverses. Hence, ∇K = π−1 : U(W,≤)→ U(W,≤) is a strict
geometric isomorphism. For (P ), we have ∇KP ⊆ P . The reason is that
if w ∈ ∇KP , there exist u ∈ W such that (u, w) ∈ R and u ∈ P . Since
R ⊆ ≤, we have u ≤ w. Since P is an upset we have w ∈ P . For (F ), we
have P ⊆ ∇KP because if w ∈ P then since (w,w) ∈ R we have w ∈ ∇KP .
And finally, for (wF ), if ∇KP = ∅, then P = ∅ because if w ∈ P then
since R is serial, there exists u ∈ W such that (w, u) ∈ R which means that
u ∈ ∇KP = ∅. This is a contradiction and hence P = ∅.
Definition 8.6. Let A = (A,≤,∧, 1,→) be a strong algebra where (A,≤)
is finitely cocomplete. Then A is called join internalizing if (a ∨ b → c) =
(a→ c) ∧ (b→ c), for every a, b, c ∈ A.
For completeness, we need the following representation theorem that we
stated in Section 6. The proof is essentially the canonical extension construc-
tion in [18] expanded to also cover both weaker and stronger cases. In fact,
in [4], we modified this construction to also address the operator ∇. Since
[4] is not accessible yet, we restate the full details and we add the proofs for
some other cases that are absent in [4].
Theorem 8.7. For any (distributive) strong algebra A = (A,≤,∧, 1,→)
that internalizes its monoidal structure [not necessarily its closed monoidal
structure if it has any] (and internalizes its join structure), there exists a
Kripke frame K and a (join preserving) strong algebra embedding i : A → SK.
Moreover, if A is a reduct of a (distributive) temporal algebra, i also preserves
∇ and for any rule scheme R ⊆ {N,H, P, F, wF}, if A satisfies R, then so
does K.
Proof. We split the proof to four cases depending on the presence of joins
and ∇. For all cases, we need the following constructions. Recall that F (A)
is the poset of all filters of A and define R as a binary relation over F (A)
as: (P,Q) ∈ R iff for all a, b ∈ A if a→ b ∈ P and a ∈ Q then b ∈ Q.
Case I. In this case both joins and ∇ are not necessarily present. Define
W = F (A) and its order as the equality on W . Then it is clear that K1 =
(W,=,R) is a Kripke frame in the sense of Example 5.4. Consider i : A →
U(W,=W ) defined by i(a) = {P ∈ F (A)| a ∈ P}. As we observed in the
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Preliminaries, i is clearly a meet-semilattice embedding. Note that for any
X and Y as the upsets of (W,=W ), the implication in SK1 is defined by:
X → Y = {P ∈ F (A)|∀Q ∈ F (A) if (P,Q) ∈ R and Q ∈ X then Q ∈ Y }
To prove that i preserves the implication, i.e., i(a → b) = i(a) → i(b), we
have to check the following two directions:
To prove i(a→ b) ⊆ i(a) → i(b), if P ∈ i(a→ b) then a→ b ∈ P . Then
assume (P,Q) ∈ R and Q ∈ i(a). Hence, a ∈ Q and since a→ b ∈ P , by the
definition of R, we have b ∈ Q, meaning Q ∈ i(b). Therefore, P ∈ i(a) →
i(b). Conversely, if P ∈ i(a)→ i(b), then consider Q = {x ∈ A|a→ x ∈ P}.
Since A internalizes its meet structure, by Remark 4.8, we have
(a→ x) ∧ (a→ y) = (a→ x ∧ y)
which means that Q is a filter. Moreover, a ∈ Q because a → a = 1 ∈ P .
Note that (P,Q) ∈ R because if x→ y ∈ P and x ∈ Q, then a→ x ∈ P and
since
(a→ x) ∧ (x→ y) ≤ (a→ y)
and P is a filter, we have a → y ∈ P which means y ∈ Q. Therefore,
(P,Q) ∈ R. Now, since a ∈ Q we have Q ∈ i(a). Since P ∈ i(a)→ i(b) and
(P,Q) ∈ R we have Q ∈ i(b), meaning b ∈ Q which by the definition of Q
means a→ b ∈ P .
Case II. In this case, again joins are not necessarily present. However,
the algebra A is a reduct of a temporal algebra. Therefore, there exists
∇ : A → A such that for any a ∈ A, a ∧ ∇(−) ⊣ (a → −). First
note that the relation R on F (A) is also definable by ∇ as (P,Q) ∈ R
iff ∇[P ] = {∇x|x ∈ P} ⊆ Q. The reason is the following: If (P,Q) ∈ R and
x ∈ P , since x ≤ 1 → ∇x and P is a filter, 1 → ∇x ∈ P . Therefore, by
1 ∈ Q and (P,Q) ∈ R we have ∇x ∈ Q. Hence, ∇[P ] ⊆ Q. Conversely, if
∇[P ] ⊆ Q, given a→ b ∈ P and a ∈ Q we have ∇(a→ b) ∈ ∇[P ] ⊆ Q and
since a ∧∇(a→ b) ≤ b we have b ∈ Q. Therefore, (P,Q) ∈ R.
Defining R in terms of ∇ has the advantage to make R monotone also
in its second argument, i.e, if (P,Q) ∈ R and Q ⊆ Q′, then (P,Q′) ∈ R.
For this part, pick W = F (A) as before and change the order on W to ⊆.
Since R is compatible with ⊆, the tuple K2 = (W,⊆,R) is a Kripke frame.
Moreover, note that i(a) for any a ∈ A is an upset with respect to ⊆. For the
preservation of the implication, since it does not depend on the order on W ,
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the argument for the previous case also works here. Therefore, we only have
to show that i preserves ∇, i.e., i(∇a) = ∇i(a). If P ∈ i(∇a), then ∇a ∈ P .
Pick Q = {x ∈ A|x ≥ a}. This is clearly a filter and (Q,P ) ∈ R because
∇[Q] ⊆ ∇{x ∈ A|x ≥ a} ⊆ P because ∇a ∈ P . Therefore, there exists
Q that includes a and (Q,P ) ∈ R. Therefore, P ∈ ∇i(a). Conversely, if
P ∈ ∇i(a), then there exists Q such that a ∈ Q and (Q,P ) ∈ R. Therefore,
∇a ∈ ∇[Q] ⊆ P and hence ∇a ∈ P . Therefore, P ∈ i(∇a)
Case III. Now, we move to the case where A is distributive and the im-
plication internalizes the finite joins while ∇ is not necessarily present. Here,
we want to construct a Kripke frame and a join preserving map i. For that
matter, as we observe in Preliminaries, it is sufficient to change W from the
set of filters of A to the set of all prime filters of A, denoted by P (A). The
same i works as an embedding and it preserves both finite meets and finite
joins. Define R as before and K3 = (P (A),=W ,R). The only thing to check
is whether i preserves both implication and ∇, again.
For the implication, by the definition of R and as we had in Case I,
i(a → b) ⊆ i(a) → i(b) is clear. For the converse, assume a → b /∈ P but
P ∈ i(a) → i(b). Define Q = {x ∈ A|a→ x ∈ P}. The problem is that this
Q is not necessarily prime. The strategy is extending it to a suitable prime
filter. Since a→ b /∈ P then b /∈ Q. Define
Σ = {S ∈ F (A) | (P, S) ∈ R, a ∈ S and b /∈ S}.
The set Σ is non-empty because Q ∈ Σ, as we have checked in Case I.
Moreover, in Σ any chain has an upper bound because if for all i ∈ I we have
(P, Si) ∈ R then (P,
⋃
i∈I Si). The reason is the following: If x → y ∈ P
and x ∈
⋃
i∈I Si then for some i ∈ I we have x ∈ Si. Since (P, Si) ∈ R,
we have y ∈ Si from which y ∈
⋃
i∈I Si. Therefore, by Zorn’s lemma, Σ
has a maximal element M . We will prove that M is prime. First note that
0 /∈ M because if so, M = A which contradicts with b /∈ M . Now for the
sake of contradiction, let us assume that x ∨ y ∈ M and x, y /∈ M . Then
we claim that either for all m ∈ M we have (m ∧ x → b) /∈ P or for all
m ∈ M we have (m ∧ y → b) /∈ P . The reason is that if for some m,n ∈ M
both (m ∧ x → b) ∈ P and (n ∧ y → b) ∈ P happen, we would have
(m ∧ n ∧ x→ b) ∈ P and (m ∧ n ∧ y → b) ∈ P . Then by distributivity and
the fact that the implication internalizes the finite joins, we reach
[m ∧ n ∧ (x ∨ y)→ b] = [(m ∧ n ∧ x→ b) ∧ (m ∧ n ∧ y → b)] ∈ P
and since [m ∧ n ∧ (x ∨ y)] ∈ M and (P,M) ∈ R we have b ∈ M which is
a contradiction. Hence, w.l.o.g. we can assume that for all m ∈ M we have
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(m ∧ x→ b) /∈ P . Then define
N = {z ∈ A| ∃m ∈M (m ∧ x→ z ∈ P )}
First note thatM ⊆ N , because for anym ∈M we have m∧x→ m = 1 ∈ P .
Similarly, we have x ∈ N . Therefore, N is a proper extension of M because
x /∈ M . Secondly, note that N is a filter because 1 = [(1 ∧ 1) → 1] ∈ P
which implies 1 ∈ N and if z, w ∈ N then there are m,n ∈ M such that
(m ∧ x → z) ∈ P and (n ∧ x → w) ∈ P . Therefore, (m ∧ n ∧ x → z) ∈ P
and (m∧n∧x → w) ∈ P . Since P is a filter and A internalizes its monoidal
structure, by Remark 4.8, we have
(m ∧ n ∧ x)→ (z ∧ w) ∈ P
Since M is a filter we have m ∧ n ∈ M which implies z ∧ w ∈ N . Thirdly,
note that we have (P,N) ∈ R because if z → w ∈ P and z ∈ N there
exists m ∈ M such that m ∧ x → z ∈ P which implies m ∧ x → w ∈ P
meaning that w ∈ N . And finally, note that b /∈ N , because for all m ∈ M
we have m ∧ x→ b /∈ P . Hence, N ∈ Σ while it is a proper extension of M .
This contradicts with the maximality of M which implies that M is prime.
Finally, since a ∈ M and b /∈ M , we have M ∈ i(a) and M /∈ i(b). Since
(P,M) ∈ R, this contradicts with P ∈ i(a)→ i(b).
Case IV. In this case, the algebra A is assumed to be a reduct of a
distributive temporal algebra and we have to show that i also preserves the
∇ operator, i.e., i(∇a) = ∇i(a). Define R as before and K4 = (P (A),⊆,R).
As we have seen in Case II, R is compatible with ⊆ and hence K4 is a Kripke
frame. Again, since the implication does not depend on the order, the proof
of preservability of implication in the Case III works here, as well. The
only thing to check is whether i preserves ∇. As we have observed in Case
II, ∇i(a) ⊆ i(∇a) is an easy consequence of the definition of R. To show
i(∇a) ⊆ ∇i(a), if Q ∈ i(∇a) then ∇a ∈ Q. Define
Σ = {S ∈ F (A)| (S,Q) ∈ R, a ∈ S and 0 /∈ S}
It is clear that P = {x ∈ A|x ≥ a} ∈ Σ, because a ∈ P , since ∇a ∈ Q, we
have
∇[P ] = {∇x|x ≥ a} ⊆ Q
and 0 /∈ P because if 0 ∈ P then 0 ≥ a which implies a = 0 and hence
∇a = 0 ∈ Q which is impossible since Q is proper. Since P ∈ Σ, the set Σ is
non-empty. Any chain in Σ has an upper bound because if for all i ∈ I we
have (Si, Q) ∈ R then ∇[Si] ⊆ Q from which ∇[
⋃
i∈I Si] =
⋃
i∈I ∇[Si] ⊆ Q
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and hence (
⋃
i∈I Si, Q) ∈ R. By Zorn’s lemma, Σ has a maximal element.
Call it M . We will prove that M is prime which completes the proof. First
note that M ∈ Σ which implies that 0 /∈ M . Hence, M is proper. Now
assume x ∨ y ∈ M and x /∈ M , y /∈ M . The filters Mx and My generated
by M ∪ {x} and M ∪ {y} are proper extensions of M . Therefore, they are
not in Σ which means that either one of them includes zero or we have both
∇Mx * Q and ∇My * Q. The first is impossible because if 0 ∈ Mx, then
there is m ∈M such that m ∧ x ≤ 0. Since A is distributive, we have
m ∧ (x ∨ y) = (m ∧ x) ∨ (m ∧ y) = m ∧ y
Since x ∨ y ∈ M and M is a filter, we have m ∧ (x ∨ y) ∈ M which implies
m ∧ y ∈ M . Therefore, since m ∧ y ≤ y we have y ∈ M which is a contra-
diction. A similar argument also works for the case 0 ∈ My. Hence, we are
in the case that ∇Mx * Q and ∇My * Q.
Therefore, there are z, w ∈ A such that ∇z,∇w /∈ Q and z ∈ Mx and
w ∈ My. Hence, there are m,n ∈ M such that m ∧ x ≤ z and n ∧ y ≤ w.
Therefore, ∇(m∧ x) /∈ Q and ∇(n∧ y) /∈ Q. Since M is a filter, m∧ n ∈M
and since x ∨ y ∈M , we have
m ∧ n ∧ (x ∨ y) = (m ∧ n ∧ x) ∨ (m ∧ n ∧ y) ∈M
which by (M,Q) ∈ R implies ∇[(m ∧ n ∧ x) ∨ (m ∧ n ∧ y)] ∈ Q and hence
∇(m ∧ n ∧ x) ∨∇(m ∧ n ∧ y) ∈ Q
and since Q is prime, either ∇(m ∧ n ∧ x) ∈ Q or ∇(m ∧ n ∧ y) ∈ Q. If
∇(m∧n∧x) ∈ Q then since ∇(m∧n∧x) ≤ ∇(m∧x) we have ∇(m∧x) ∈ Q
which is a contradiction. A similar argument also works for the other case.
Hence, M is prime. Finally, since a ∈M and (M,Q) ∈ R we have Q ∈ ∇i(a)
which completes the proof.
Finally, we have to address the preservability of the validity of the rule
schemes. For (N), if A satisfies the scheme (N), ∇ commutes with all fi-
nite meets. We want to find an order preserving function π(P ) such that
(P,Q) ∈ R iff P ⊆ π(Q). Define π(P ) = ∇−1[P ]. It is clearly order preserv-
ing. Note that (P,Q) ∈ R is equivalent to ∇[P ] ⊆ Q which is equivalent
to P ⊆ π(Q). The only thing to show is that π(P ) is actually a filter if we
are in Case II and it is a prime filter if we are in Case IV. First, ∇−1[P ]
is clearly an upset. Since 1 = ∇1 and P is a filter, we have 1 ∈ ∇−1[P ].
Moreover, if x, y ∈ ∇−1[P ] then ∇x,∇y ∈ P . Since P is a filter and
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∇x∧∇y = ∇(x∧y), we have ∇(x∧y) ∈ P and hence x∧y ∈ ∇−1[P ]. More-
over, if A has all finite joins, then ∇−1[P ] is prime because if x∨y ∈ ∇−1[P ],
then ∇(x ∨ y) ∈ P . Since ∇ has a right adjoint, it commutes with all joins
and hence ∇x ∨ ∇y ∈ P . Since P is prime, either ∇x ∈ P or ∇y ∈ P .
Therefore, either x ∈ ∇−1[P ] or y ∈ ∇−1[P ]. Moreover, 0 /∈ ∇−1[P ] because
otherwise, ∇0 = 0 ∈ P which is impossible, since P is prime.
For (H), note that ∇ and  as two operators over the Lindenbaum alge-
bra are inverse of each other. Hence, ∇−1 as an operation over all filters or
prime filters is an isomorphism. For (P ), given (P,Q) ∈ R, we have P ⊆ Q.
Because, given a ∈ P and the fact that (P,Q), we have ∇[P ] ⊆ Q which
implies ∇a ∈ ∇[P ] ⊆ Q. Hence, ∇a ∈ Q. Finally, we have a ∈ Q Since
∇a ≤ a. For (F ), we have to show (P, P ) ∈ R. The reason is that we have
∇[P ] ⊆ P , because for any a ∈ P , we have a ≤ ∇a which implies ∇a ∈ P .
(∗) [We denote this part by (∗) for the future reference.] Finally, for (wF ),
first note that this rule scheme is also expressible by implication via 1→ 0 =
0. The reason is that if we have (wF ), then by adjunction ∇(1 → 0) ≤ 0
from which ∇(1 → 0) = 0 and by (wF ) we have 1 → 0 = 0. Conversely, if
1 → 0 = 0 and ∇a = 0, then a ≤ 1 → ∇a = 1 → 0 = 0 from which a = 0.
Now let us prove that even in the Case III where ∇ is not present, and we
have a distributive join internalizing strong algebra A = (A,≤,∧, 1,→) if
1 → 0 = 0, then the defined R is serial. This generality will be useful later
in the last section. For the proof, let P be a prime filter. We have to find
a prime filter M such that (P,M) ∈ R. Define Q = {x ∈ A|1 → x ∈ P}.
Similar to what we had in the four cases above, Q is a filter and (P,Q) ∈ R.
Note that 0 /∈ Q, because otherwise, 1 → 0 = 0 ∈ P which is impossible.
Define
Σ = {S ∈ F (A) | (P, S) ∈ R and 0 /∈ S}.
The set Σ is non-empty because Q ∈ Σ. Moreover, in Σ any chain has an
upper bound. The proof is similar to the Case III. Hence, by Zorn’s lemma,
Σ has a maximal element. Similar to the proof of the Case III, this M is
prime which completes the proof.
Theorem 8.8. (Completeness) For any rule scheme R ⊆ {N,H, P, F, wF},
the logic iSTL(R) is complete with respect to the class of all K(R)-Kripke
models.
Proof. For completeness, since the Lindenbaum algebra of the logic iSTL(R)
is clearly a distributive join internalizing temporal algebra, then if we apply
Theorem 8.7 on it, it produces a Kripke frame K = (W,≤, R) and an em-
bedding i. Then define V : At(L∇)→ U(W,≤) by V (p) = i([p]) where [p] is
52
the equivalence class of p in the Lindenbaum algebra. It is routine to check
that {w ∈ W | w  B} = i([B]) for any formula B ∈ L∇. Therefore, if
Γ ⇒ A is valid in all K(R)-Kripke models including (W,≤, R, V ), we will
have i([Γ]) ⊆ i([A]). Since i is an embedding, it implies [Γ] ≤ [A] which
simply means that iSTL(R) ⊢ Γ⇒ A.
Lemma 8.9. In Corollary 5.13, if S satisfies any rule scheme in {F,wF},
then so does T .
Proof. Note that we defined ∇ = f∇Sf!. If S ∈ ST(wF ), then T ∈ ST(wF )
because for any a ∈ Y, if ∇a = 0, then f∇Sf!a = 0. Since f is an embedding,
∇Sf!a = 0. Since S ∈ ST(wF ), we have f!a = 0. Then f!a ≤ 0 implies
a ≤ f(0). But f(0) = 0 because f is join preserving. Hence, a = 0. For (F ), if
S ∈ ST(F ), then we have ∇Sf!a ≥ f!a from which ∇a = f∇Sf!a ≥ ff!a ≥ a.
The last inequality is from the adjunction f! ⊣ f . Hence, T ∈ ST(F ).
Theorem 8.10. Let X be a topological space, Y be an Alexandroff space and
f : X → Y be a continuous surjection. Then for any ∇Y over O(Y ) and any
valuation V : At(L∇) → O(Y ), there exist ∇X over O(X) and a valuation
U : At(L∇) → O(X) such that for any sequent Γ ⇒ A, (O(X),∇X , U) 
Γ⇒ A iff (O(Y ),∇Y , V )  Γ⇒ A. Moreover, for any class C from iST(F )
and iST(wF ), if (O(Y ),∇Y ) ∈ C then (O(X),∇X) ∈ C. Hence, if X C
Γ⇒ A then Y C Γ⇒ A.
Proof. Let ∇Y : O(Y )→ O(Y ) be a join preserving map and V : At(L∇)→
O(Y ). By Corollary 5.14, since f is a continuous surjection and Y is Alexan-
droff, there exists a join preserving map ∇X : O(X)→ O(X) such that f−1 :
(O(Y ),∇Y ) → (O(X),∇X) becomes a logical morphism. Therefore, f−1
commutes with all connectives of the language L∇. Define U(p) = f−1(V (p)).
For any formula B ∈ L∇, it is evident that U(B) = f−1(V (B)). Now note
that (O(X),∇X, U)  Γ ⇒ A iff U(Γ) ⊆ U(A) iff f−1(V (Γ)) ⊆ f−1(V (A)).
Since f is surjective, f−1 is an embedding. Thus, the last is equivalent to
V (Γ) ⊆ V (A) iff (O(Y ),∇Y , V )  Γ ⇒ A. Finally, note that if for any
class C from the classes iST(F ) and iST(wF ), if (O(Y ),∇Y ) ∈ C then
(O(X),∇X) ∈ C, from Lemma 8.9.
The following theorem uses the Kripke completeness to show that for the
for the topological completeness theorem and for the logics iST, iST(F )
and iST(wF ), even one fixed and large enough discrete space is sufficient.
This means that despite the intuitionistic logic, IPC, these logics can not
understand the difference between discrete sets (complete for classical logic)
and topological spaces (complete for intuitionistic logic).
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Theorem 8.11. (Topological Completeness Theorem, Strong version) Let X
be a set with cardinality at least 2ℵ0. Consider X as a discrete space. Then:
(i) If X iST A then iSTL ⊢ A.
(ii) If X iST(F ) A then iSTL(F ) ⊢ A.
(iii) If X iST(wF ) A then iSTL(wF ) ⊢ A.
Proof. For (i), let K = (W,≤, R, V ) be the Kripke model in the proof of
Kripke completeness theorem. Note that U(W,≤) is Alexandroff. The cardi-
nality of this space is at most 2ℵ0, since the Lindenbaum algebra is countable.
Hence, there exists a surjective function f : X → Y . Since X is discrete, f is
also continuous. Therefore, the claim follows from the last part of Theorem
8.10. The proofs for the other parts are similar.
Remark 8.12. Note that the Theorem 8.11 is not true without the size
condition. Interestingly, it is not true for a singleton set X = {0}. The
reason is that in this space we always have p ∨ ¬p. There are only two
possibilities for ∇ : {0, 1} → {0, 1}. Since ∇0 = 0, we have either ∇1 = 0
or ∇1 = 1. In the second case, ∇ collapses to identity and hence p ∨ ¬p
is valid because validity is just the boolean validity. In the first case, since
∇1 = 0, we have (∇1∩V (p)) = 0 ≤ 0 which implies 1 ≤ (V (p)→ 0). Hence,
(V (p)→ 0) = 1 from which [(V (p)→ 0)∪ V (p)] = 1. However, p∨¬p is not
provable in neither of the logics iST, iST(F ) and iST(wF ), because all of
them are sub-logics of IPC.
9 Sub-intuitionistic Logics
Sub-intuitionistic logics are the propositional logics of the weak implications.
They are usually defined by weakening certain axioms and rules for the in-
tuitionistic implication including the modus ponens rule and the implication
introduction rule in the natural deduction system. As we have mentioned
before, the logics of spacetime are also designed for the same purpose. In
this section we will show how the structural logics of spacetime provide a
well-behaved conservative extension for sub-intuitionistic logics. Moreover,
we will also use spacetimes to provide a topological semantics for these logics.
First let us review some important sub-intuitionistic logics, introduced
in [50], [51], [39], [18], [11], [44], [20], and [21] and investigated extensively
in [13], [12], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [19], [45], and [48]. To complete the list we
also define one new logic, EKPC and we will explain its behaviour later.
Consider the following rules of the usual natural deduction system:
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Propositional Rules:
⊤
Γ ⊢ ⊤
Γ ⊢ ⊥
⊥
Γ ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ A ∨B Γ, A ⊢ C Γ, B ⊢ C
∨E
Γ ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ Ai(i = 0, 1) ∨I
Γ ⊢ A0 ∨ A1
Γ ⊢ A0 ∧ A1(i = 0, 1) ∧E
Γ ⊢ Ai
Γ ⊢ A Γ ⊢ B
∧I
Γ ⊢ A ∧B
A ⊢ B
→ I
⊢ A→ B
Formalized Rules:
Γ ⊢ A→ B Γ ⊢ A→ C (∧I)fΓ ⊢ A→ B ∧ C
Γ ⊢ A→ C Γ ⊢ B → C (∨E)fΓ ⊢ A ∨B → C
Γ ⊢ A→ B Γ ⊢ B → C trf
Γ ⊢ A→ C
Additional Rules:
Γ ⊢ ⊤ → ⊥
E
Γ ⊢ ⊥
Γ ⊢ A Γ ⊢ A→ B
MP
Γ ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ A
Cur
Γ ⊢ ⊤ → A
The logic KPC is defined as the logic of the system of all the propositional
and formalized rules. BPC is defined as KPC+Cur; EKPC as KPC plus
the rule E; EBPC as BPC plus the rule E; KTPC as KPC plus the rule
MP and finally IPC is defined as BPC plus the rule MP .
Remark 9.1. First note that in the algebraic terminology, the rules state
that the connective → is an implication that internalizes both the monoidal
structure, i.e., the meet and the finite joins. Secondly, note that in defining
the consequence relation ⊢ for sub-intuitionistic logics, we mostly follow [18],
where KPC and KTPC are called wKσ and wKσ(MP ). Here, we follow
the modal naming tradition to call them KPC and KTPC since, they are
sound and complete with respect to the class of all and reflexive Kripke
models, respectively. The final point to make is on the axiomatization of
BPC. This logic can be also defined as KPC plus the relaxed version of
→ I as defined in [12]:
Γ, A ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ A→ B
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To prove the equivalence, it is clear that the rule Cur is provable by this
more strong version of → I. For the converse, first we will show that using
the rule Cur, C ⊢ D → C is provable, for all the formulas C and D. First
use Cur on C to prove C ⊢ ⊤ → C and since D ⊢ ⊤, we have ⊢ D → ⊤.
By formalized tr, we have C ⊢ D → C. Coming back to the proof of the
converse part, assume Γ, A ⊢ B. It is easy to see that
∧
Γ ∧ A ⊢ B and
then ⊢
∧
Γ∧A→ B, by the original version of → I. By the foregoing point
and the formalized ∧I, we can prove
∧
Γ ⊢ A →
∧
Γ ∧ A, which implies∧
Γ ⊢ A→ B, by trf . Therefore, Γ ⊢ A→ B.
Definition 9.2. By a propositional Kripke model for the usual propositional
language Lp, we mean a tuple K = (W,R, V ), where W is a set, R ⊆W ×W
is a binary relation over W (not necessarily transitive or reflexive) and V :
At(Lp)→ P (W ), where At(Lp) is the set of atomic formulas of Lp and P (W )
is the powerset of W . A propositional Kripke model is called persistent if
V (p) is R-upward closed, i.e., if u ∈ V (p) and (u, v) ∈ R then v ∈ V (p). The
model is called serial if R is serial, i.e., for all u ∈ W there exists v ∈ W such
that (u, v) ∈ R. It is called reflexive if R is reflexive, i.e., (w,w) ∈ R, for
all w ∈ W . It is called transitive if R is transitive, i.e., for all u, v, w ∈ W
if (u, v) ∈ R and (v, w) ∈ R then (u, w) ∈ R. It is called a rooted tree if it
has an element r such that for any w 6= r we have (r, w) ∈ R, it is transitive
and for any u, v, w ∈ W , if (u, w), (v, w) ∈ R and u 6= v then exactly one
of the cases (u, v) ∈ R or (v, u) ∈ R happens. The forcing relation for
a propositional Kripke model is defined as usual using the relation R. A
sequent Γ ⇒ A is valid in a propositional Kripke model if for all w ∈ W ,
∀B ∈ Γ (w  B) implies w  A.
Theorem 9.3. (Soundness-Completeness for Sub-intuitionistic Logics)
(i) KPC is sound and complete with respect to the class of all propositional
Kripke models. [18]
(ii) EKPC is sound and complete with respect to the class of all serial
propositional Kripke models.
(iii) KTPC is sound and complete with respect to the class of all reflexive
propositional Kripke models. [18]
(iv) BPC is sound and complete with respect to the class of all transitive
persistent propositional rooted Kripke trees. If Γ = ∅, the finite rooted
transitive trees are sufficient. [13]
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(v) EBPC is sound and complete with respect to the class of all transitive
serial persistent propositional rooted Kripke trees. If Γ = ∅, the finite
rooted transitive serial trees are sufficient. [11]
(vi) IPC is sound and complete with respect to the class of all transitive
reflexive persistent propositional rooted Kripke trees. If Γ = ∅, the
finite rooted transitive reflexive persistent trees are sufficient.
Proof. We have to prove the case of EKPC. For soundness, note that the
rule E is valid in all serial Kripke models. Let (W,R, V ) be such a model. If
Γ ⊢ ⊤ → ⊥
E
Γ ⊢ ⊥
and for some u ∈ W , u  Γ, then by the validity of the premise, u  ⊤ → ⊥.
Since R is serial, there exists v ∈ W such that (u, v) ∈ R. Hence, v  ⊥,
which is impossible. Hence, u 1 Γ from which u  Γ⇒ ⊥. For completeness,
use the Lindenbaum algebra for EKPC. This algebra is clearly a distributive
join internalizing strong algebra that satisfies 1→ 0 = 0. Therefore, by part
(∗) in the proof of Theorem 8.7, it is possible to embed the algebra into its
canonical Kripke model with a serial relation R. Note that the Kripke frame
from the proof of Theorem 8.7 is in the form (W,=W , R). Therefore, since
the validity for ∇-free sequents in any model of the form (W,=W , R, V ) is
equivalent to its validity in the propositional Kripke model (W,R, V ), the
completeness follows.
Note that the language Lp is a fragment of the full language L∇. There-
fore, it is meaningful to use spacetimes and Kripke models (not propositional
Kripke models we have just defined) as models for sub-intuitionistic logics.
Theorem 9.4. (Embedding Theorem) Assume Γ ∪ {A} ⊆ Lp, where Lp is
the usual language of propositional logic. Then:
(i) Γ ⊢KPC A iff Γ ⊢iSTL A iff iST  Γ⇒ A iff K  Γ⇒ A.
(ii) Γ ⊢EKPC A iff Γ ⊢iSTL(wF ) A iff iST(wF )  Γ⇒ A iff K(wF )  Γ⇒
A.
(iii) Γ ⊢KTPC A iff Γ ⊢iSTL(F ) A iff iST(F )  Γ⇒ A iff K(F )  Γ⇒ A.
(iv) Γ ⊢BPC A iff Γ ⊢iSTL(P ) A iff iST(P )  Γ⇒ A iff K(P )  Γ⇒ A.
(v) Γ ⊢EBPC A iff Γ ⊢iSTL(P,wF ) A iff iST(P,wF )  Γ⇒ A iff K(P,wF ) 
Γ⇒ A.
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(vi) Γ ⊢IPC A iff Γ ⊢iSTL(P,F ) A iff iST(P, F )  Γ⇒ A iff K(P, F )  Γ⇒
A.
Proof. Let us start with the embedding of the sub-intuionistic logics into the
logics of spacetime. This part is just the syntactical version of the algebraic
fact that the connective → in a temporal algebra is really an implication
which internalizes both the monoidal structure and the finite joins. How-
ever, to show the proof theoretical flavour of the system, let us present the
proof trees for all sub-intuitionistic rules. This hopefully shows the more nat-
ural adjoint-based approach to implication compared to the sub-intuitionistic
proposal.
To prove the embedding, we use induction on the length of the sub-
intuitionistic proof. Note that all the axioms and the propositional rules
except → I are available in the basic system iSTL. Therefore, it remains to
prove the formalized rules and the rule → I. This is what we will do in the
following proof trees. Note that by a double line rule, we mean the existence
of an easy omitted proof tree between the upper part and the lower part
of the double line and by the label S together with a double line, we mean
that the omitted tree is a simple combination of the structural rules. For the
formalized ∧I, we have:
∇(A→ B), A⇒ B
S
∇(A→ B),∇(A→ C), A⇒ C
∇(A→ C), A⇒ C
S
∇(A→ B),∇(A→ C), A⇒ C
R∧
∇(A→ B),∇(A→ C), A⇒ B ∧ C
∇[(A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)], A⇒ B ∧ C
R→
(A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)⇒ A→ (B ∧ C)
(A→ B), (A→ C)⇒ A→ (B ∧ C)
and for the formalized ∨I, we have:
∇(A→ C), A⇒ C
S
∇(A→ C),∇(B → C), A⇒ C
∇(B → C), B ⇒ C
S L∨
∇(A→ C),∇(B → C), B ⇒ C
∇(A→ C),∇(B → C), A ∨B ⇒ C
∇[(A→ C) ∧ (B → C)], A ∨B ⇒ C
R→
(A→ C) ∧ (B → C)⇒ A ∨B → C
(A→ C), (B → C)⇒ A ∨ B → C
for the formalized tr, we have:
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∇(A→ B), A⇒ B ∇(B → C), B ⇒ C
cut
∇(A→ B),∇(B → C), A⇒ C
∇[(A→ B) ∧ (B → C)], A⇒ C
→ I
(A→ B) ∧ (B → C)⇒ A→ C
(A→ B), (B → C)⇒ A→ C
And finally for → I we have:
⇒ ⊤
A⇒ B
LW
∇⊤, A⇒ B
R→
⊤ ⇒ A→ B
cut
⇒ A→ B
Now we have to show that the additional rules are provable by their corre-
sponding additional rules in the logics of spacetime. For Cur, we will use its
characterization based on → I as mentioned in the Remark 9.1.
∇(
∧
Γ)⇒∇(
∧
Γ)
P
∇(
∧
Γ)⇒
∧
Γ
Γ, A⇒ B
∧
Γ, A⇒ B
cut
∇(
∧
Γ), A⇒ B
R→∧
Γ⇒ A→ B
Γ⇒ A→ B
For MP and E we have:
A→ B ⇒ A→ B
F
A→ B ⇒ ∇(A→ B) A,∇(A→ B)⇒ B
L→
A,A→ B ⇒ B
⊤,∇(⊤ → ⊥)⇒ ⊥
∇(⊤ → ⊥)⇒ ⊥
wF
⊤ → ⊥ ⇒ ⊥
This completes the embedding part of the theorem. To complete the equiv-
alences, it is enough to close the circle by coming back from the validity in
the Kripke models to provability in the sub-intuitionistic logics. For KPC,
by Theorem 9.3, it is sufficient to prove Γ ⇒ A is valid in all propositional
Kripke models. Let (W,R, V ) be a propositional Kripke model. Consider the
tuple (W,=, R, V ), where the order is just equality. This tuple is a Kripke
model, since R is compatible with the equality and V maps atomic formulas
to =-upward closed subsets of W that are just all subsets. Since Γ ⇒ A is
valid in all Kripke models, it is valid in (W,=, R, V ). However, the forcing
in this model and the original propositional model is the same for ∇-free
formulas. Therefore, Γ ⇒ A is also valid in (W,R, V ). For (ii) and (iii)
the argument is similar. For (iv), again by Theorem 9.3, it is sufficient to
prove the validity of Γ ⇒ A in all transitive persistent Kripke trees. Let
(W,R, V ) be such a tree. Define ≤R as the reflexive extension of R, i.e.,
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R ∪ {(w,w) ∈ W 2|w ∈ W}. Since the model is a tree, ≤R is a partial order.
Since, R is transitive, R is also compatible with ≤R and hence (W,≤R, R, V )
is a Kripke frame. Moreover, note that R ⊆ ≤R and if a set is R-upward
closed, it is also ≤R upward closed. Therefore, (W,≤R, R, V ) is a K(P )-
Kripke model and hence Γ ⇒ A is valid in (W,≤R, R, V ). Again since the
validity of Γ ⇒ A in (W,R, V ) is the same as validity in (W,≤R, R, V ) for
∇-free formulas, the theorem follows. The remained cases are similar to
(iv).
In the presence of the rule Cur, it is also possible to strenghten the
topological completeness to capture the logics via one arbitrary infinite fixed
Hausdorff space. For that matter, we need the following topological lemma:
Lemma 9.5. Let X be an infinite Hausdorff space. Then every finite rooted
tree is a surjective continuous image of X.
Proof. Let us first prove the following claims:
Claim I. For any natural numbers N and K, there exists a natural num-
ber M =MN,K such that for any Hausdorff space X with cardinality greater
than or equal to M , there are K many open mutually disjoint subspaces of
X each of which has at least N elements.
Proof of the Claim I. We prove the claim by induction on N . For N = 1,
pick M1,K = K and prove the claim by induction on K. For K = 1, it is
enough to pick the whole space as the open subset. To prove the claim for
K+1, by IH, sinceM1,K+1 = K+1 ≥ K, it is possible to find at least K non-
empty mutually disjoint open subsets {Ui}Ki=1. Pick {xi}
K
i=1 as some elements
such that xi ∈ Ui. It is possible because they are not empty. Since the space
has at least K + 1 elements, there should be some point x /∈ {xi}
K
i=1. Now,
use the Hausdorff condition to find a sequence {Vi}
K+1
i=1 of non-empty mutu-
ally disjoint open subsets. The argument is as follows. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ K,
there exist disjoint open subsets Ai and Bi such that x ∈ Ai and xi ∈ Bi.
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ K, take Vi = Ui ∩Bi and also define VK+1 =
⋂K
i=1Ai. They
are clearly open non-empty subsets that are mutually disjoint.
Now, if we have the claim for N , we want to prove it for N +1. By IH we
know that there exists M ′ that works for N and K ′ = 2K. We claim that
M = M ′ works for N + 1 and K. If X has at least M ′ elements, then there
are at lest 2K mutually disjoint opens such that each of them has at least
N elements. If we arrange these 2K, to K pairs and compute their unions,
then we have K opens, each of which contains at least 2N elements, which
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is greater than or equal to N + 1.
Claim II. For any natural number n, there exists a natural number m
such that for any Hausdorff space with at least m elements and any finite
rooted tree with at most n elements, there exists a continuous surjection from
the space to the tree.
Proof of the Claim II. We will prove the claim by induction on n. For
n = 1 pick m = 1 and use the constant function. For n + 1, by IH, we
know that for n there exists an m′. Pick m as the number in the claim 1,
for N = m′ and K = n. Therefore, the space X has at least n opens each
of which contains at least m′ elements. Call them {Ui}ni=1. Since the tree
has n+ 1 elements, there are at most n branches for the root such that each
of them has at most n nodes. Call these branches {Tj}rj=1 for some r ≤ n.
By IH, we can find a surjective continuous function fi : Ui → Ti for any
1 ≤ i ≤ r. Now define f : X → T as the extension of the union of fi’s
such that it sends any x /∈
⋃r
i=1 Ui to the root of the tree. The function is
clearly surjective. For continuity, note that any open subset of the tree is an
upward-closed subset which means that it is either equal to T or is a union of
the upward-closed subsets of the Ti’s. For the first case, f
−1(T ) = X which
is open. For the second case, it is implied from the continuity of fi and the
condition that Ui is open.
To prove the theorem, let T be a rooted tree with n elements. Then by
Claim II, there exists a bound m such that for any Hausdorff space X with
at least m elements, there exists a continuous surjection from X to the tree.
The theorem follows from the fact that X is infinite and hence has at least
m elements.
Definition 9.6. Let R ⊆ {P, F, wF} and X be a topological space. By
X g
R
A, we mean that for any spacetime (O(X),∇) and any V : At(Lp)→
O(X), if (O(X),∇, V )  iSTL(R) then (O(X),∇, V )  A.
Theorem 9.7. (Topological Completeness Theorem, Strong version) Let X
be an infinite Hausdorff space. Then:
(i) If X gP A then BPC ⊢ A.
(ii) If X gP,wF A then EBPC ⊢ A.
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(iii) If X gP,F A then IPC ⊢ A.
Proof. The proof is a truth transformation sequence starting from a proposi-
tional Kripke tree, going to an appropriate Kripke model and then to a suit-
able spacetime to finally land in a spacetime over X , using Theorem 8.10.
More precisely, for (i), let (W,R, V ) be a finite transitive rooted tree. To
prove BPC ⊢ A, by Theorem 9.3, it is enough to show that (W,R, V )  A.
As we have seen in the proof of Theorem 9.4, it is possible to define the
Kripke model K = (W,≤R, R, V ) such that K  iSTL(P ) and the validity of
∇-free formulas in (W,R, V ) and K are equivalent. Therefore, it is enough to
prove K  A. By Example 5.4, it is possible to turn the Kripke model K to
the spacetime SK equipped with a valuation V¯ , again with the same validity
for every sequents. Hence, we will show that (SK, V¯ )  A. By Lemma 9.5,
there exists a surjective continuous function f : X → W where W is con-
sidered with the upset topology by the order ≤R. By Theorem 8.10 and the
fact that the order topology is Alexandroff, there are ∇ : O(X)→ O(X) and
U : At(L∇) → O(X) such that the validity of any sequent in (SK, V ) and
(O(X),∇, U) are the same. Hence, it is enough to prove (O(X),∇, U)  A.
Since, (O(X),∇, U), the topological model (SK, V¯ ) and the Kripke model K
have the same validity and K  iSTL(P ), we have (O(X),∇, U)  iSTL(P ).
Finally, since, X gP A, we have (O(X),∇, U)  A. The proofs for (ii) and
(iii) are exactly the same.
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